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Resumen
En este artículo se comparan las experiencias del Este Asiático y América Latina en cuanto a
crecimiento y ajuste macroeconómico entre los años 1970 y 2000. Los resultados indican que la
diferencia entre ambas regiones se puede atribuir a que difieren en factores fundamentales de
crecimiento tales como su tasa de inversión, recursos humanos, fertilidad, calidad de sus instituciones,
estabilidad macroeconómica y grado de apertura comercial. También se examina el rol que cumplen
las diferencias de calidad en la educación y la desigualdad entre ambas regiones. También han
contribuido a diferenciar el comportamiento del crecimiento los shocks de balanza de pagos. El
análisis revela que las tasas de crecimiento tienden a caer solo temporalmente luego de una crisis de
balanza de pagos para luego volver a los niveles previos a la crisis, lo que produce la típica forma de
“v” en las funciones de producto tanto en el Este Asiático como en América Latina. Sin embargo, a
menudo se asocia una crisis de balanza de pagos con una caída sustancial de las tasas de crecimiento,
la que termina en una nueva crisis en el futuro. Tras analizar qué determina el costo de las crisis en
términos de producto, se puede concluir que la liquidez internacional, la solvencia financiera, la
depreciación del tipo de cambio real y la política monetaria juegan roles esenciales en cuanto a
reducir las pérdidas de producto.
Abstract
This paper compares the experience of growth performance and macroeconomic adjustment between
East Asia and Latin America from 1970 to 2000. We find that the difference in growth performance
between two regions can largely be attributed to the differences in fundamental growth factors such as
investment rate, human resources, fertility, institutional quality, macroeconomic stability and the
degree of trade openness. We also discuss the role of quality of education and differences in inequality
between the two regions. Balance-of-payments crisis shocks have also contributed significantly to
differences in growth performance. Analysis reveals that growth rates tend to fall only temporarily
following a balance-of-payments crisis and then rebound to the pre-crisis levels, producing the typical
v-type pattern for output in both East Asia and Latin America. However, a balance-of-payments crisis
is often associated with a large decline of growth rates and develops into another crisis in the future.
Analyzing what determines the output cost of crises we find that international liquidity, financial
soundness, real exchange rate depreciation and monetary policy play a critical role in reducing output
losses.
_________________
We appreciate comments from Raimundo Soto, John Weiss, and seminar participants at the Asian Development
Bank Institute (ADBI)- Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) conference, the Central Bank of Chile and
Univesitat Pompeu Fabra. Part of this work was prepared while Jong-Wha Lee was visiting the Central Bank of
Chile. He gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Central Bank of Chile, and the Latin
America/Caribbean and Asia/Pacific Economics and Business Association (LAEBA). The views expressed are
the authors’ and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions the authors are affiliated with.
E-mails: jdegrego@bcentral.cl, jongwha@korea.ac.kr.1
1. Introduction
What determines economic growth, the policies that affect it and how to spur it are all
tremendously important issues. The well being of the population and prospects for
poverty reduction are intimately related to economic growth.  Even the issue of potential
growth is at the heart of recent discussions on stabilization policy.  Whether a central
bank should attempt to cool down the economy or not, or what is the actual fiscal
impulse, will depend crucially on what is the view of the rate of growth that can be
sustained without facing inflationary pressures.
During the past four decades growth rates in the world have varied greatly. The four East
Asian tigers -Hong Kong SAR, South Korea (Korea henceforth), Singapore, and Taiwan-
grew extremely rapidly at an average of over 6.0 percent a year in per capita terms
between 1960 and 2000. On the other hand, many countries in Latin America recorded
less than 1.0 percent growth during the same period. The high growth of East Asian
countries, compared to the poor performance of Latin American economies leads directly
to the question of what are the fundamental factors that explain such differences, and
what should be done to spur growth.
In this paper we assess the evolution of growth in those two regions and attempt to
explain the poor performance of Latin America relative to East Asia.
Using cross-country growth regressions, we find that the traditionally important growth
factors such as investment, population growth, and the quality of human resources
explain almost a half of the difference in per capita GDP growth between East Asia and
Latin America. In addition, economic policy and institutional factors, such as rule of law,
government consumption, macroeconomic stability and the degree of openness explain
the other half of the growth differences between East Asia and Latin America. The
occurrence of balance-of-payments crises also contributed to lower growth in Latin
America relative to East Asia.
We extend the discussion on growth determinants to the role of income distribution and
the quality of education.  Although those variables do not enter satisfactorily into growth
regressions, due to collinearity or lack of available data, we provide evidence suggesting
that they may help to explain why the regions have different institutions and policies.
Comparing the experience of adjusting from currency crises in East Asia and Latin
America, we find that the adjustment process is in general consistent with the stylized v-
pattern observed in all crisis episodes. The mean growth rates hit the bottom at the time of
the crisis or one year after, and then tend to return to the pre-crisis trend rate during the two
or three years following the crisis.
However, output losses have been very severe in some recent crises such as the East
Asian crisis of 1997. Therefore, it is important for an economy to reduce its vulnerability
to crises, and avoid the severe output losses once it is hit by a crisis.2
By examining the patterns of adjustment from previous crisis episodes, we identify the
factors that help countries avoid a large decline in growth during the crisis and recover to
the pre-crisis potential growth path.  It appears that adequate international liquidity, real
exchange rate depreciation and sound banking system play a critical role in avoiding
severe shocks from a crisis.  A good external environment also speeds up recovery,
limiting the cost of crisis. We have also found that expansionary monetary policy may be
relevant in dampening the crisis cost, but no significant effects for fiscal policy.
The paper follows in five sections. In section 2 we present an overview of East Asian and
Latin American growth over the past forty years. In section 3 using cross-country
regressions, we explain what have been the critical factors behind Latin America’s low
growth performance relative to East Asia, and also discuss prospects for the future. In
section 4, we analyze the patterns of adjustment from previous crisis episodes, and
compare the experience of East Asian and Latin American crisis episodes. In section 5 we
investigate the factors that help countries avoid severe output losses following crisis and
return more quickly to the pre-crisis potential growth path. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. Overview
Compared to East Asia, Latin America’s growth performance was disappointing. Table 1
presents the details of growth in a sample of 21 Latin American countries and 9 East
Asian economies we analyze in this paper.
1  All averages are constructed unweighted by
size, thus giving the same weight to all countries.
2
Clearly, average growth rates in Latin America have been below the East Asian averages
over the past four decades. For Latin America as a whole, average per capita GDP growth
was 1.3% from 1960 to 2000, compared to 4.6 % in East Asia over the same period.
Those differences are astonishing.  While per capita income in East Asia increased
sevenfold, in Latin America it did not even double.
Latin America's bad performance in these 40 years is not entirely a consequence of the
debt crisis and the so-called "lost decade" of the eighties. Its performance has been
consistently poor, with average growth rates well below those of East Asia.   However,
the 1980s were the years with the biggest difference in growth rates: 4.5% in East Asia,
 –0.8% in Latin America. In some sense, therefore, one may support the view that growth
performance was particularly poor during the debt crisis.
It is interesting to note that average GDP per capita in Latin America was more than
twice the average in Asian countries in 1960, but low growth over the next 40 years
reverted this situation bringing the Asian average per capita GDP to twice that of Latin
                                                
1 The East Asian nine economies are: China, Hong Kong  SAR , Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The 21 Latin American countries are listed in table 1.
2 We use GDP data from Penn-World Tables version 6.1, as described in Summers and Heston (1991) and
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). The selection of countries was made on the basis of data availability
for regressions in Section 3.3
America.  This is a crude proof of the income differences that can accumulate from
having low growth vis-à-vis high growth during a period of forty years.
Note that over the period the growth performance of the East Asian region as a whole has
been declining. The average per capita GDP growth rates were 5.4% in the 1970s
dropping to 4.5% in the 1980s and 4.0% in the 1990s.  Growth rates plunged most
sharply in the five countries that were most affected by crises: Thailand, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Korea.
The 90s is also a period in which growth recovered in Latin America, but it was still
lower than during the 60s and 70s.  However, growth experiences were much more
diverse.  The standard deviation of growth was almost twice that of the 60s.  The top four
countries in terms of growth during the nineties, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Chile and
Argentina, grew faster than the top four during the 60s, Panama, Brazil, Trinidad and
Tobago and Peru.  But, during the 90s, six countries experienced negative growth,
whereas none did during the 60s.
It is also important to note that the good performance of Latin America in the 60s and 70s
was in the context of strong growth of the world economy.  Indeed, as table 1 shows,
during the 60s Latin America grew below the world economy, and in the 79s grew 0.2
percentage points than the world economy, but in the 90s the growth of Latin America
was 0.30 percentage points above the world economy.
There are many factors that could explain low growth performance of Latin America, and
we will revisit some of them in a later section of this paper.  There are some previous
studies that discuss empirical evidence concerning Latin American growth.  De Gregorio
(1992), using a five-year panel data for 12 Latin American countries between 1950 and
1985, finds that the two most important factors inhibiting growth in Latin American
countries are low investment and high inflation.
Regarding inflation, Latin America has been by far the region with the highest inflation
rate in the past 30 to 40 years, and this has hindered growth. Inflation affects growth
through many channels.
3 As argued by Fischer (1993), the high rate of inflation is also a
summary statistic for macroeconomic mismanagement and for the inability of
governments to put in place sound economic policy.  In a panel-data framework similar to
that of De Gregorio (1992), Corbo and Rojas (1993) find that inflation and black market
premium are both significant determinant of growth when entered separately in the
regressions.  But, when jointly included, the two variables are not significant.  More
recent evidence, however, has shown that in a large sample of countries inflation and
black market premium are both negatively correlated with GDP growth.
Thus, the evidence highlights the importance of macroeconomic stability to spur growth.
In addition to inflation and black market premium, there is also evidence that shows the
                                                
3 See De Gregorio (1996) for further discussion on channels through which inflation affects growth, and
how they are consistent with existing evidence.4
importance of having low budget deficits, but also some structural measures such as trade
openness and depth of the financial sector.
During the 90s, Latin American countries made important progress in terms of reforms.
There were important improvements in macroeconomic stability as well as structural
reforms.  In a recent and comprehensive review of reforms and growth performance, Lora
and Panizza (2002) show that countries that had the best growth performance were also at
the forefront of reforms. Contrary to previous estimates, they show that reforms increase
growth temporarily.  In fact, during the early 90s reforms explain an increase in growth of
1.3%, but it declined to 0.6%, when no reforms were implemented.  This is consistent
with the neoclassical growth model, in which reforms increase long-term income,
increasing transitional growth.  As time goes on, the effect of reforms on growth
diminishes, although the income gains remain.
The recent experience of Argentina is a dramatic reminder that structural reforms are not
enough. Macroeconomic stability as well as institution building are essential to avoid
large declines in income, that may neutralize all the gains achieved by reforms.
3.  Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-country Analysis
In this section, we explore the main factors that influenced growth of per capita income
over the past three decades. The analysis is based on a general framework of cross-
country regressions, which puts the experience of an individual country in a global
context. This approach allows us to understand the specific factors associated with
economic growth across countries and the key differences between fast and slow growing
economies. Based on this framework, we explore the factors that explain why Latin
American countries grew much slower than the best performing economies in East Asia.
This exercise will provide a basis for understanding future growth prospects of the East
Asian and Latin American countries.
3.1 The Basic Empirical Framework
The basic empirical framework is based on an extended version of the neoclassical
growth model, as described by Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), Barro
and Lee (1994), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). This model predicts “conditional
convergence” of income, implying that a country with a lower initial income relative to
its own long-run (or steady-state) potential level of income grows faster than a higher-
income country over time. The basic idea is that the farther an economy locates away
from its steady-state level, the greater is the gap of reproducible (physical and human)
capital stock per worker and technical efficiency from their long-run potential levels. The
gap of existing capital and technology from their steady-state levels provides the low-
income economy with the chance to catch up rapidly with the high-income country,
through high rates of capital accumulation as well as diffusion of technology from the
more technically advanced economies. In the cross-country context, convergence implies
that poorer countries would grow faster than richer countries, when controlling for the5
variables influencing the steady-state level of per capita income. As a reduced form the
model can be represented by
(1) e b b b + + + = = i i i Ti yiT Z y T y y g 3 0 2 0 0 ) log( / ) / log(
where the dependent variable is the growth rate of per capita income for the period T for
country i, log(y0i) is a log value of the initial level of per capita income for country i, and
Zi denotes an array of the variables that influence the country i's steady-state level of per
capita income. The conditional convergence implies a negative coefficient on the initial
income.  Note that the variables included in Z could affect either the rate of productivity
growth or the rate of capital accumulation.
A wide variety of external environment and policy variables will affect growth rates by
influencing the long-run potential income and the rate of productivity growth. The
extended Solow-type neoclassical growth model emphasizes investment rate, population
growth, and human capital as important factors that determine the steady-state level of
income  (see, for example, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)). Previous empirical
research also considers institutions and policy factors as the important determinants of
long-run per capita income (Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1996; and Barro, 1997).
They include government consumption, rule of law, inflation, democracy, and trade
openness.
The external environment and policy variables that we consider are as follows
4:
Investment:  In the neoclassical growth models, a higher value of saving rate, domestic
and foreign, raises the steady-state level of output per capita (equation (1)) and thereby
increases the growth rate for a given starting value of GDP.
Fertility: The fertility rate is an important influence on population growth, which has a
negative effect on the steady-state ratio of capital to worker in the neoclassical growth
model. Hence, the model predicts a negative effect of fertility on economic growth.
Higher fertility also reflects greater resources devoted to child-rearing, and for this reason
it is better to use fertility rates than population growth.
Human Resources: The various models of new growth theories emphasize human capital
as a key factor to drive the long-term growth of income. In the framework of extended
neoclassical growth model, for given values of the other explanatory variables, a higher
human capital stock leads to a higher steady-state per capita income. In the endogenous
growth model, human capital generates perpetual growth by either preventing returns to a
broad capital from falling or by increasing capabilities for the innovation and adaptation
of new technologies. The human resource variables include a measure of human capital
stock.  We use the average years of secondary and higher schooling for males aged 25
and over, available from Barro and Lee (2001). The greater initial educational stock
                                                
4 Our empirical framework includes a representative set of the explanatory variables that have been widely
used in previous work.  See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Ch. 12) for details.6
indicates that more skilled workforce can produce more output from given natural and
physical resources. Hence, the country with a greater education stock is in a more
favorable condition for future growth. In addition, life expectancy at birth, as a log value
at the initial year of the period, is used to measure health attainment, which is considered
as another important component of human capital stock. A higher life expectancy would
tend to indicate a healthier, more productive worker.
Institutions and Policy Variables: We consider five institutions and policy variables. The
first variable we consider is government consumption (defined as the average ratio of
government consumption in final goods to GDP). The measure of government
consumption used here excludes public expenditure on education and defense because
these two categories of government expenditure can be regarded as primarily investment
(Barro, 1991 and Barro and Lee, 1994). Higher government consumption leads to lower
growth because it shifts resources from productive activities and distorts private
decisions.
The second institution and policy variable is a measure of overall maintenance of the rule
of law in the economy. An environment that secures property rights and provides a strong
legal system is central for investment and other aspects of economic activities. The best
available indicators to measure quality of institutions come from international consulting
firms that give advice to international investors based on information collected by local
experts. Knack and Keefer (1996) introduce measures of institutional quality initially
devised by Political Risk Services. The measures consist of five indicators including (a)
quality of bureaucracy, (b) corruption in government, (c) rule of law, (d) expropriation
risk, and (e) risk of repudiation of contracts by government.  Among the various
indicators, the measure of the rule of law is considered to have the most explanatory
power for economic growth (Barro, 1997). We use this measure of law enforcement,
which was rescaled to zero-to-one scale, with one being the most effective.
The third policy measure is inflation rate. De Gregorio (1992, 1996), Fischer (1993), and
Barro (1997) find that inflation has a significant negative effect on growth. Hence, the
worsening price stability, caused by macroeconomic mismanagement, seems to lead to
lower steady-state level of per capita output for given values of other explanatory
variables.
We also include a measure of "democracy" as another institution variable. This measure
is constructed by Barro (1997) based on the measure originally constructed by Gastil. It
measures the strength of electoral rights and civil liberties, scaled from zero to one, where
one corresponds to the highest level of democracy. The relationship between democracy
and economic growth is not clear. For example, a more democratic political regime can
entail redistribution of income from rich to poor.  This redistribution may reduce the
incentives of people to work and invest, and thus go against economic growth. But,
reducing income inequality and having an open political system can reduce the tendency
for social unrest and thus contribute positively to overall economic activity.7
The last policy variable is a measure of openness. Open economies have greater access to
cheap imported intermediate goods, larger markets, and advanced technologies. Lee
(1993) and Frankel and Romer (1999) find evidence that more open economies tend to
grow faster. We measure the extent of each economy’s openness by the ratio of exports
plus imports to GDP. Openness is well-known to vary by country size--larger countries
tend to be less open because a larger internal market can help reduce reliance on
international trade. The openness measure used in this analysis filters out the normal
relationship (estimated in another regression system) of international openness to the logs
of population and area. This filtered variable thus reflects the influences of government
policies, such as tariffs and trade restrictions, on international trade (see Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004, Ch. 12).
Terms of Trade Shock: The terms of trade shock is considered as an exogenous factor that
affects the growth rate of an individual economy. Improvement in the terms of trade,
measured as the ratio of export to import prices, can make a country produce more and
expand its export sector.
Balance-of-Payments Crisis: External imbalances normally affect mostly cyclical
fluctuations rather than long-run growth. However, when a significant balance-of-
payment difficulty causes a crisis, it can disrupt the whole economy because the
uncertainty it generates discourages investment and other productive activities, while
increasing speculative activities. Financial distress may lead to bankruptcies of profitable
firms that would otherwise have been viable. Barro (2001) shows that currency crises
have a negative influence on economic growth.
We define a balance-of-payments crisis dummy variable for each country during any
five-year period to equal one if a crisis occurred during the period and otherwise to take
on the value zero. The definition of balance-of-payments crisis is discussed in section 4.1.
Table 2 provides statistics of the basic data for all 85 countries in the sample, for the
beginning and latest sub-periods, 1970-75 and 1995-2000. The table also compares the
statistics between Latin America and East Asia. It confirms that over the past three
decades, the group of nine East Asian economies was better placed for rapid growth than
the Latin American group in terms of most structure and policy environments. A notable
exception is that in 1995-2000 a larger fraction of the East Asian region was subject to
balance-of-payments crises than the Latin American region. And, the faster increase in
income due to the higher growth performance in the East Asian economies led them to
face a less favorable convergence effect in the 1995-2000 period than not just in their
earlier period but also with respect to the Latin American countries as a whole.
Our regression of specification (1) applies to a panel set of cross-country data over six
five-year periods from 1970 to 2000, corresponding to the periods 1970-75, 1975-80,
1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-95, and 1995-2000.
5 The dependent variables are the annual
growth rates of real GDP per capita over the six five-year periods: 1970-75, 1975-80,
                                                
5 We do not include the 1960s period in the regression because the currency-crisis variable is only available
from 1970.8
1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-95, and 1995-2000. Some previous studies used cross-section
data in which each country has only one observation. The approach based on the panel
data set seems to consider more information that is available from time series variations
within each country.
One concern in the empirical specification is that any effect from contemporaneous
explanatory variables may reflect reverse causation from GDP growth to the explanatory
variables. For example, the relationship between contemporaneous investment and
growth may reflect high growth causing high saving. This problem, however, can be
solved by adopting the instrumental-variables estimation technique. We estimate this
system of the six equations by three-stage least squares.
6  The instrumental-variable
technique controls for the possible simultaneity problem when Zi--the control variables--
are endogenously determined. Instruments are mostly lagged values of the independent
variables (see the notes to Table3). We use prior colonial status (Spanish or Portuguese
colonies and other colonies) as instruments for inflation rate in the instrumental-variable
technique as in Barro (1997). In order to control for the possible reverse causation from
lower growth to higher frequencies of balance-of-payments crisis, we use the ratio of
international reserve to monthly imports at the beginning of each five-year period as an
instrument for balance-of-payments crisis.
3.2 Regression Results
Table 3 presents the regression results using the basic framework of equation (1) and the
explanatory variables just described. The three-stage least squares technique applies to a
data set for 85 countries.
Column 1 of table 3 shows the result of the basic regression without including balance-
of-payments crisis dummy variable.  Column 2 includes as an independent variable the
balance-of-payments crisis dummy. Although columns 1 and 2 show a similar pattern of
results, substantial differences arise for inflation and schooling variables. The estimated
effect of inflation on growth becomes much smaller when we include the balance-of-
payments crisis variable. This may reflect the strong positive correlation between
inflation and balance-of-payments crisis. On the contrary, the schooling variable becomes
more significant in column 2 where the balance-of-payments crisis variable is added.
Since the balance-of-payments crisis variable itself enters very significantly, we focus on
the result of column 2.
The result shows strong evidence for conditional convergence: the coefficient on the log
value of initial GDP in column 2 is highly significant, and the estimated coefficient is -
0.025 (standard error = 0.004).  Thus, a poor country with a lower initial income level
                                                
6 The estimation weights countries equally but allows for different error variances in each period and for
correlation of these errors over time. Some studies suggest estimating panel growth regressions by the
fixed-effects estimation technique, considering for an unobservable country fixed effect. However, the
fixed-effects technique eliminates information from cross-section variations (see Barro, 1997, pp.36-39).
Temple (1999) discusses other statistical problems concerning the estimation and interpretation of cross-
country growth regressions.9
grows faster, controlling for the variables that influence the steady-state level of income.
Specifically, the coefficient implies that a country with half the income level of another
country grows by 1.73 percentage points (=2.5%*ln(2) ) faster than the richer country.
The investment rate and fertility variables come to have strong effects on growth rate.
The estimated coefficient on investment rate is positive and statistically significant at the
5% level. The coefficient 0.056 (s.e. = 0.027) implies that a one standard deviation
increase, equivalent to 8.3 percentage point in the ratio of investment to GDP in the 1995-
99 period, is associated with an increase in the growth rate of about 0.5 percentage points
per year. The estimated coefficient on the logarithm of fertility rate is strong negative, -
0.015 (s.e. = 0.006), implying that an increase of 0.51 (the variable’s standard deviation)
in fertility rate in 1995 is estimated to lower the growth rate by about 0.8 percentage
points per year.
The result of column 2 shows that human resource variables have a significantly positive
effect on economic growth. The educational attainment variable, which is measured by an
average year of secondary and tertiary schooling of male adult population, has a positive
effect on the growth rate: the estimated coefficient, 0.0029 (s.e. = 0.0017), is statistically
significant at the 10% critical level. The mean and standard deviation of the schooling
variable were 2.4 and 1.5 per year respectively in 1995. Therefore, the coefficient
indicates that one standard-deviation increase in the secondary and higher schooling
raises the growth rate of per capita income by about 0.4 percentage points per year. The
logarithm of life expectancy at age 1— a measure of health attainment— is highly
significant in the regression: the estimated coefficient 0.065 (s.e. = 0.021) implies that
increase in life expectancy by 0.13 (the standard deviation of the log of life expectancy)
in 1990 is estimated to raise the growth rate by about 0.9 percent per year.
We find clear evidence that the institution and policy variables play a significant role in
determining economic growth. The government consumption variable has a significantly
negative impact on growth: an increase in government consumption ratio by one
percentage point reduces growth by 0.07 percentage points a year.  In the sample, a one
standard deviation of 5.5 percentage points over the 1995-99 period decreases the growth
rate of per capita income by about 0.4 percentage points per year.
The rule of law index has a strong positive effect on growth, indicating that countries
with more effective law enforcement for the protection of property and contractual rights
tend to have higher growth rates. The estimated coefficient, 0.018 (s.e. = 0.008) implies
that a one standard deviation increase of 0.22 in this index (on a scale of 1.0) in the 1995-
99 period is associated with an increase in the growth rate of about 0.4 percentage points.
The openness variable appears to be positively associated with growth rate. The estimated
coefficient 0.0086 (s.e. = 0.0046) is significant at the 10% level. An increase of an
economy’s openness by 0.4 (its standard deviation) over the 1995-99 period is estimated
to raise the growth rate of about 0.4 percentage points per year.  10
The regression result confirms the non-linear relationship between democracy and
growth, as found by Barro (1997). The coefficients on the indicator of democracy and its
square terms are positive and negative respectively and both of them are statistically
significant. The pattern of coefficient values indicates that growth increases with political
freedom in low level of democracy but decreases with it once the society has attained a
certain level of political freedom. The estimated coefficients in column 2 imply that the
switch occurs at a level of democracy of 0.635. Both Latin America and East Asian
regions on average were below this critical value in the 1970s. However, in the 1995-99
period, Latin America’s average level of democracy, 0.732, slightly exceeded this critical
level.
Column 2 shows that the effect of inflation on economic growth is negative but
statistically insignificant.  The estimated coefficient, -0.013 (s.e. = 0.009), implies that an
increase in the average rate of inflation by one standard deviation of 9.7 percent over the
1995-99 period would lower the growth rate by 0.1 % per year.  Note that the coefficient
is less than half the value of column 1, where inflation has a greater impact on growth.
As we saw earlier, the problem is the correlation between balance-of-payment crises and
inflation.
The regression result shows a less significant effect of the terms of trade change on per
capita GDP growth. The estimated coefficient on the growth rate of the terms of trade is
0.035 (s.e.= 0.023), indicating that countries with favorable terms of trade shock by one
standard deviation of 0.039 in the 1995-99 period grew by about 0.1 percentage points
per year more than other countries.
The balance-of-payments crisis turns out to have a strong, negative effect on economic
growth. The estimated coefficient on the balance-of-payments crisis variable is -0.017
(s.e.= 0.005), indicating that a balance-of-payments crisis shock lowers the growth rate
by 1.7 percentage points per year.
Column 3 of table 3 adds a lagged effect of a balance-of-payments crisis. The result
confirms that of Barro (2001). The retardation of growth by a balance-of-payments crisis
does not persist into the next five-year period. In fact, the effect of a balance-of-payments
crisis on economic growth in the subsequent five-year period turns out to be positive but
statistically insignificant. Therefore, a balance-of-payments crisis reduces income
permanently, although it has no permanent effects on growth.
Table 3 also shows the result of regression with the inclusion of regional dummies.
Column 4 of table 3 shows that Latin American dummy has a statistically insignificant
coefficient while East Asian dummy is marginally significant at the 10 percent level. It is
interesting to note that earlier empirical studies found a significant and negative "Latin
American dummy" (Barro, 1991), which in the current empirical framework becomes
insignificant, and indicates that the explanatory variables included at the right-hand side
explain most of the poor performance of Latin American economies.  However, the point
estimates, although small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, still indicate that
besides the variables included, Latin America has lower growth rates than average, and
East Asia has higher growth rates than average. Even with the two regional dummies11
controlled, the regression shows that most of the explanatory variables are still significant
and have the estimated coefficients of the same magnitude, compared to those in column
2 of table 3.
3.3 Economic Growth of Latin America in Comparative Perspective
The cross-country regression results allow us to analyze growth performance of the Latin
American countries relative to performance in other regions. We compare the growth
performance of Latin America to the best performance of East Asia. Average per capita
growth rates for the nine economies in the East Asia region were 5.6%, 5.1% and 4.3%
over each decade of the 1970-2000 period, while those for the 21 Latin American
countries were 2.1%, -0.8% and 1.6% respectively.
We use the point estimates of the parameters in the regression (2) of table 3 for a simple
"accounting" that breaks down the fitted values of growth rates for each country into the
contributions from each of the explanatory variables. Although the residual errors in
individual country growth rates are substantial, it is worthwhile to examine the
differences in the explanatory variables that generate the differences in the fitted growth
rates. We then explore the sources of the differences in the fitted growth rates between
East Asia and Latin America.
Table 4 presents the results. The basic regression can account for a substantial part of the
growth differences between two regions. For the 21 Latin American countries, the
predicted growth rate is 3.1 percentage points lower on average than that of East Asia
over the whole period from 1970 to 2000, while the actual difference was 3.6 percentage
points, and therefore we can explain the bulk of the differences.  It is interesting to note,
however, that the larger difference occurs during the “lost decade” of the eighties.  This
predicted difference can be broken down separately into the contributions from the 12
explanatory variables.
The relatively higher income level of Latin America compared to that of Asia in 1970,
led to lower growth in this region in the 1970-90 period because of the convergence
effect. However, this convergence effect became rather favorable to Latin America since
1980 when the income of East Asia exceeded that of Latin America. Hence, the net
convergence effect becomes negligible over the three decades from 1970 to 2000.
In 1970 Latin America had a slightly higher life expectancy and thus a better condition
for growth than East Asia. But, in general Latin America had relatively poorer human
resources--in terms of lower educational attainment and lower life expectancy--than East
Asia. The regional differences have widened over time. The net effect of human
resources contributed to slower growth in Latin America by about 0.3 percentage point
relative to Asia over the whole period.
Investment rate and fertility had strong effects on Latin America's performance relative to
Asia by lowering the per capita growth rate by about 0.6 and 0.5 percentage points per
year respectively over the past three decades.   Without this difference, Latin America12
would have had a level of per-capita income 25% higher after the thirty years ending in
2000.
The institution and policy variables turned out to have a significant effect on differences
in growth rates.  The differences in growth may be due to low (human and physical)
capital accumulation, or low productivity growth.  The growth effects of institutions and
policies that we discuss now can occur by reducing productivity and the speed of catch-
up to the technological frontier, and changing the incentives for (physical and human)
capital accumulation.
The combined effect of the differences in the five policy variables--government
consumption, rule of law, inflation, democracy, and trade openness--accounted for 1.6
percentage points slower growth of Latin America relative to Asia over the period from
1970 to 2000. The institution and policy variables contributed most to the difference in
growth rates by 2.0 percentage points in the 1980-90 period.  That is, during the debt
crisis, policies and institutions deteriorated significantly in Latin America.  As we
emphasize below again, although external conditions could have deteriorated internal
policies and institutions, the bad growth performance, even in a period with negative
external environment such as the eighties, can be traced to bad policies and institutions.
Among the institution and policy variables, trade openness was the most important
variable. Latin America's relatively inward-oriented trade strategy accounted for slower
growth of about 0.6 percentage points per year in Latin America.  Latin America does not
only have lower trade share (exports plus imports share on GDP), but most of the
countries are smaller in size and population than Asian countries, which further reduces
its effective trade openness.
The higher inflation in Latin America also reduced growth by 0.3 percentage points
relative to Asia over the whole period from 1970 to 2000. The negative effect of high
inflation was more significant in the 1980s, lowering growth by 0.7 percentage points in
Latin America relative to Asia.  During the 80s the average inflation rate in Latin
America was 48.5%, while during the same period, for our sample of 9 East Asian
countries it was 2.6%.  As discussed above, this effect does not include the likely
detrimental effects of inflation on investment; however the evidence shows that the
effects of inflation on investment are much smaller than the effects of inflation on
productivity growth (De Gregorio, 1996).
Government consumption and rule of law also contributed to the lower growth rate of
Latin America by 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points per year respectively over the three
decades. By contrast, democracy turned out to play an insignificant role on growth
difference between the two regions. On average East Asia’s low political freedom, which
is far lower than the “critical turning point”, has been relatively unfavorable to economic
growth. Because democracy has a nonlinear effect on per capita growth, its very low or
high values would be more detrimental to growth. In this respect, the democracy level for
China, Indonesia and Haiti were very low, while Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago13
were on the high side of the distribution. But, for most East Asian and Latin American
countries, the democracy level has not made a significant difference to their growth rates.
Table 4 shows that the effect of the relatively unfavorable terms-of-trade shock was also
small in Latin America. This result questions the view that the problem of Latin America
was due to its patterns of specialization that faced a particularly unfavorable external
scenario.   According to the advocates for the import substitution strategy of Latin
America in the sixties, countries should pursue internal industrialization since the
products they exported had declining terms of trade.  But, the evidence from our
regression shows that the latter argument is wrong and that it is precisely openness, as
part of good policies and institutions that boosts fast and lasting growth.
In addition, the external environment could explain part of the poor performance during
the debt-crisis.  As we see, the largest difference between predicted and actual growth
occurs in the 80s.  This difference of 1.4 percentage points, even after we control for
policies, institutions, terms of trade and balance of payments crisis, is not explained by
the growth regressions.  Of course, as we discuss in the next section, the output losses
from currency crisis do not only depend on external factors, but also on some internal
factors such as initial conditions and policy responses.
On the other hand, the balance-of-payments crisis contributed to growth in Latin America
being about 0.2 percentage points less than in East Asia over the whole period. It had the
biggest effect in the 1980-90 period, explaining the growth differential of 0.5 percentage
points. But, in the 1990s, when East Asian economies also suffered from balance-of-
payments crises, its contribution to the growth differential became negligible.  
Thus, while initial income and external conditions explain only moderate differences in
growth rates, the major differences are produced by investment, human resources and the
institution and policy variables. The traditionally important growth factors such as
investment, fertility, and the quality of human resources contributed significantly to the
difference in per capita GDP growth between East Asia and Latin America. Moreover,
relatively poor economic policies, such as trade protection, high inflation, high
government consumption, and lack of good institutions have been very important factors
contributing to the relatively slow growth of  Latin American countries during the past
three decades.
Table 4 focuses on the relatively poor performance of Latin American countries
compared to East Asia. But, there were also tremendous variations in growth
performance among Latin American countries. While the best performing, Dominican
Republic and Chile, grew by 3.2 and 2.4 percent per year during the period 1970 to 2000,
the worst performers, Nicaragua and Venezuela, registered negative growth rates of -2.7
and -1.7 percent. In addition, growth rates fluctuated a lot within each country. For
instance, average per capita growth for Chile was only around 1.2 percent over the period
1970-90 but increased dramatically to 4.8 percent over the period 1990-2000. On the
contrary, with the exception of Philippines, the 9 Asian countries all had strong growth
throughout most of those three decades without significant variations.14
For this reason we investigate to what extent variations in growth performance of
individual Latin American countries can be attributed to the factors that explain the
international growth variations, in particular, to what extent the variations are due to
differences in domestic institutions and policies. We therefore extend table 2 of the entire
period by breaking down Latin America into 21 individual countries.
Based on the regression result of column 2 of table 3, we can assess how much of the
variations in growth performance of individual Latin American countries relative to the
performance in East Asia can be attributed to each explanatory variable. Table 5 shows
the effect of various factors on the difference between predicted and actual growth to 10
selected Latin American economies over the whole period from 1970 to 2000. For
instance, the predicted growth rate for Chile is 2.6 percentage points lower on average
than the East Asian region, while the actual difference was 2.1. The relatively higher
income level of Chile compared to East Asia led to a drop of 0.5 percentage points in
Chile’s growth because of the convergence effect. Investment represented a 0.5
percentage points growth while fertility and human resources made no significant
contribution to the growth differential. Chile’s sound rule of law accounts for the 0.2
percentage point edge over East Asia but other institutions and economic policies were
relatively unfavorable to growth in Chile. The combined effect of the differences in the
other four policy and institutional variables --high government consumption, high
inflation, low levels of democracy, and low trade openness-- accounted for 1.5 percentage
points slower growth of Chile relative to the group of nine East Asian countries from
1970 to 2000.  Most of these indicators improved during the nineties, which contributed
to growth above the East Asian average, only surpassed by China and Taiwan in the
whole decade.
The negative effect of poor institutions and policies on growth is evident in all Latin
American countries. In some countries such as Bolivia, Haiti, and Nicaragua, poor
institutions and economic policies completely outweigh the favorable factor of lower
initial income, leading to a far slower average per capita growth compared to the East
Asia region. For example, Haiti would have grown by 3.7 percentage points more than
East Asia thanks to its relatively lower initial income level. But, it turned out that Haiti’s
average growth rate over three decades was about 2.8 percentage points lower than the
East Asian average because of poor human resources and economic institutions.
Some Latin American countries more prone to crisis over the past three decades
(Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico) show significantly lower growth rates, about 0.7
to 0.9 percentage points down on East Asia.15
3.4 Growth Prospects for East Asia and Latin America.
The results from cross-country regressions can be used to construct forecasts of economic
growth for individual countries. The projected growth rates for 2001-2010 are obtained
by multiplying 2000 values (or the 1995-99 period average) of explanatory variables by
the estimated coefficients in the panel regression of column (2) in table 3.  Terms-of-trade
shocks are assumed to be equal to those in the 1990s. We assume no balance-of-payments
crisis.
The results of growth projection for East Asia and Latin America are presented in table 6.
We only provide the regional averages.
For the 21 Latin American countries, the predicted growth rate is estimated to be 2.3
percent over the 2001-2010 period, increasing from the average of 1.6 percent during the
nineties. On the contrary, the average growth rate for the East Asian region is predicted to
be 3.8 percent that is very close to the average of 4.0 percent in the last decade. Hence,
the growth differential between two regions will shrink substantially to 1.4 percentage
points, compared to 3.1 percentage points over the whole period from 1970 to 2000 and
1.9 percentage points over the 1990-2000 period.  This is explained basically by
convergence, since the high initial income in East Asia slows down growth vis-à
-vis Latin America.
Overall, growth in Latin America is predicted to be higher than in any single decade of
the previous 40 years, with the exception of the sixties when it was equal.  Although
modest when compared to East Asian performance, this rate of per-capita income growth
is almost twice that of 1960-2000.  Improved institutions and policies help to explain why
Latin America could do better.
The predicted difference of average growth rates over the period of 2001-2010 can be
broken down separately into the contributions from the 12 explanatory variables.
The result of table 6 shows that the convergence effect becomes quite unfavorable to East
Asia due to its higher income relative to that of Latin America in 2000. The net
convergence effect during the 2001-2010 period is predicted to make the average growth
rate of the East Asian region 1.7 percentage points per year lower than that of the Latin
American region.  Therefore, considering the effect that convergence has in reducing the
differences across regions, the rest of the factors influencing growth still explain a large
difference of about 3 percentage points.
The increasing gap between Latin America and East Asia in terms of human resources is
likely to contribute to the slower growth of Latin America with a net effect of some 0.6
percentage points over the 2001-2010 period. Although both regions have experienced
improvements in human resources (see table 2), the differences have widened and the
human resources variables explain a larger difference than in the past.  The difference in
investment still explains about 0.7 percentage points in growth differentials.16
The institution and policy variables are expected to maintain strong effects on differences
in growth rates. The combined effect of the differences in the five policy variables
--government consumption, rule of law, inflation, democracy, and trade openness-- is
expected to account for 1.3 percentage points slower growth of Latin America relative to
East Asia over the period from 2001 to 2010.
Note that we assume no crisis will occur to any region. But, crises often recur. The crisis
could make big differences to our predictions. The estimation shows that the occurrence
of a balance-of-payments crisis would lower the growth rate by 1.7 percentage points per
year. This is equivalent to the predicted differential of growth rates between the two
regions over the 1990-2000 period.
3.5 Extensions: Quality of Education and Income Distribution
Empirical studies of  the determinants of economic growth suggest numerous additional
explanatory variables.  Our framework captures most important growth determinants, but
some missing variables could also have a bearing on performance, particularly in Latin
America and East Asia.  These variables could be relevant growth determinants although
the regressions may not capture them well because lack of data or collinearity problems
with the other independent variables that may hamper the possibility to find sensible
estimates.
One important additional variable is the quality of schooling.
7 The schooling variable
considered in basic regressions refers to the quantity of education, as measured by years
of schooling, rather than the quality. An alternative measure of educational stock, which
is considered to reflect variations of educational quality between countries, are the scores
achieved in internationally comparable tests in the subjects of science and mathematics.
Conceptually, the quality of education is reflected in the performance of students and
graduates. One shortcoming of these data, however, is that the observations apply to
different years and are most abundant for the 1990s. Based on the limited sample, Barro
(1999) and Hanushek and Kimko (2000) find that test scores are positively related to
growth rates of real per capita GDP in cross-country regressions.
Table 7 shows the average test scores on mathematics and science for seventh grade
students in the countries that participated in the cross-national achievement tests. In 1991
the international Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP) conducted tests of
mathematics and science achievements of 13-years-old students. The International
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) also carried out the
Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) in 1994 and 1995.
Among the 44 participating countries that participated in the IAEP and/or TIMMS
projects, students in the East Asian economies- China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan - showed the highest achievements in mathematics.  For example,
                                                
7 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) show that some additional regressors are statistically significant when
they are added one at a time to the regression, similar to our framework shown in table 3. Notably,
schooling quality and geography variables are found to enter significantly.17
in the IAEP mathematics test, China ranked first with the students’ average score of 80.2,
followed by Korea and Singapore. In contrast, Brazil, which is the only participating
Latin American country, came last, with the average score of 34.7, after Mozambique.
Among the 39 countries that participated in the TIMSS, Singapore, Korea, Japan, and
Hong Kong ranked top four in mathematics with the average scores ranging from 56.4 for
Hong Kong to 60.1 for Singapore. In contrast, Colombia, which is the only participating
Latin American country, performed significantly less with the mean of 36.9, placing it
second to the last after South Africa.
The results are also favorable for Asia in science tests, for which Asian students
performed much better than those of Latin America. Although evidence on the quality of
schooling is still scarce, there is a very clear gap between Latin America and Asia, which
adds to the deficiencies in the quality of human resources we already discussed in the
previous sections.
Other area where the differences between Latin America and Asia are evident, although
not included in the independent variables in our regressions, is income distribution.
Figure 1 shows Gini coefficients for Latin American and Asian countries, with Japan and
the US for comparison. Data are taken from the World Development Report of the World
Bank, for the closest year, which in most cases is between 1996 and 1998.  There are
several problems that make it difficult to compare across countries.  For example,
differences depend on whether the unit of analysis is household or individual, whether
income is measured before or after tax, or whether the surveys refer to income or
expenditure.  However, despite all of those caveats, the conclusion is undisputable:
inequality in Latin America is much greater than in Asia, and as we argue below it could
explain differences in human resources, policies and institutions between the two regions.
The relationship between income distribution and growth has recently been a hot topic.
Theoretical discussion often predicts negative effects of inequality on growth (Alesina
and Rodrik 1994, and Persson and Tabellini 1994). Most cross-country empirical studies
also find support for a negative relationship between income inequality and growth
(Alesina and Rodrik 1994, and Perroti 1996). However, some recent studies based on the
panel-data estimation find a positive relationship (Li and Zou 1998, and Forbes 2000).
The main problem affecting cross-country empirical investigation is the quality and
comparability of the data measured with small differences often resulting in large
differences in the estimated relationship between inequality and growth.
We have investigated the effects of inequality on growth in our panel framework. Our
measure of income inequality is Gini index. The data come from the UNU/WIDER –
UNDP World Income Inequality Database (WIID), which extends Deininger and Squire
(1996) data set.
The first row of table 8 reports the estimated coefficient on Gini index when it is added to
the systems in row 2 of table 3. The overall sample size for the panel regressions
decreases from 464 to 277, because many fewer observations of Gini coefficients are
available than for the full sample considered in table 3. In the system, the Gini value18
around 1970 appears in the equation for growth from 1970 to 1975, and so on. The five-
year lagged values of the Gini coefficients are added to the list of instruments.
The estimation result shows that there is no significant impact of Gini coefficients on
economic growth. The estimated coefficient, -0.001(s.e.=0.018) is essentially zero. Thus,
with the other explanatory variables considered in growth regressions held constant,
differences in income distribution have no significant relation in subsequent economic
growth.
Although income inequality has no direct impact on growth, additional effects can arise
from the influence of inequality on the explanatory variables. One of these effects
suggested by previous studies involves the impact of income distribution on fertility. Row
2 of table 8 shows the estimation result for a panel system in which the log of the fertility
rate is the dependent variable. In this system, the explanatory variables include the log of
per capita GDP and Gini index. The lagged values of the log of per capita GDP and Gini
index are used as instruments. The result confirms a strong positive impact of inequality
on fertility.
In the theories based on political economy arguments, inequality affects government
expenditure and thereby affects growth.  In unequal societies, there are more incentives
for redistributive politics (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Row 3 of table 8 shows direct
consideration of a panel system in which government consumption ratio is the dependent
variable. We find a significant influence from the Gini index.
Another channel by which income inequality influences growth is educational attainment.
Poor families that are faced with borrowing constraints are not able to invest in their
children even when the returns on education are very high.  Poor families have problems
to send their children to school even under free schooling, since they often need income
from their children’s employment. This occurred relatively less in more equal societies,
for the same level of income, where the parents are able to pay the costs of education.
More equal distribution enables more households to send their children to school. Row
(4) of table 8 confirms that there is a strong negative impact of income inequality on
secondary school enrollment. Lower secondary school enrollment will lead to smaller
secondary educational stock in time, and consequently have an adverse impact on
economic growth. Thus, income distribution affects growth through the human capital
channel.
We also find a strong negative impact of income inequality on institutional quality. Row
(5) of table 8 shows the estimation result for a panel system in which the log of the rule-
of-law index is the dependent variable. We find a significantly negative impact of the
Gini index on the rule of law.  Political economy considerations can also help to explain
why corruption, rule of law, and institutional quality in general is weaker in more unequal
societies.
Overall, we find substantial evidence that inequality affects growth indirectly by
influencing fertility, government consumption, education and rule-of-law. Consider as an19
example the estimated coefficient of 0.143 on the Gini coefficient in row 3 of table 8.
This point estimate implies that an increase in the Gini coefficient by 0.1 (its standard
deviation), that is 10 percentage points, raises the government-consumption ratio by 1.4
percentage points of GDP. If we multiply this value by the estimated coefficient on the
government-consumption ratio in the growth regression (-0.07 in column 2 of table 3), we
get -0.001. Thus, this indirect channel lowers economic growth by about 0.1 percentage
point. Similarly, the point estimate of -0.87 on the Gini coefficient in the regressions for
rule of law (row 5 of table 8) and the estimated coefficient on the rule-of-law index in the
growth regression (0.018 in column 2 of table 3) imply that an increase in the Gini
coefficient by 0.1 leads to a decrease in growth rate by about 0.16 percentage point
indirectly through deteriorating institutional quality.
This evidence suggests that although there is not a significant direct effect of income
distribution on economic growth in our regressions (row 1 in table 8), inequality may be
detrimental to economic growth by increasing distortions, weakening institutions and
reducing the quality of human resources.  More research needs to be done to establish the
definite connections, since up to this point we have seen some very suggestive
correlations.
In addition, the accounting exercises overall show that although the gap in growth rate
between Latin America and East Asia will narrow in the next decade, it will still remain
substantial due to the differences in investment, fertility, schooling, and some policy
variables such as government consumption, rule of law, and inflation.
Therefore, Latin America must work further to improve the investment rate, fertility,
schooling, and institutions. Two important policies to achieve this objective involve
increasing public saving and expanding educational enrollments. Increase in public
saving will contribute to increase investment rate, contain pressures on government
consumption, tax distortions, and high inflation rates. Increase in educational
enrollments, particularly at secondary level, will help to lower fertility and increase
educational attainments.
But, improvement in public finance and education investment is not easy. As we just
analyzed in Section 3.2, high government expenditure and lower educational enrollments
are to a certain extent an outcome of unequal income distribution. Latin American
countries have more unequal income distribution than East Asian countries, and the
evidence on the determinants of income distribution show that this gap cannot be closed
in a short period of time. For example, improvements in education take time to pass
through to a large share of the labor force (see, e.g., De Gregorio and Lee, 2002).
4.  Crisis, Adjustment and Sustained Growth
In the previous section, we find that a balance-of-payments crisis reduces growth rates in
the years close to the crisis.  Such crises have contributed to the differences in growth
performance between East Asia and Latin America of 0.25 percentage points per year20
over the 1970-2000 period. This is not minor, since it is about 40% of the difference
explained by investment rates, or almost the same as the difference explained by human
resources.  Moreover, if East Asia could have avoided the severity of the1997 crisis, a
much larger part of regional growth differences would have been attributed to a balance-
of-payments crisis. Hence, it is important for an economy to reduce its vulnerability to a
crisis and thereby avoid the deleterious effect of financial turmoil on economic growth.
Once an economy is hit by a crisis, the necessary adjustments must be made quickly so
that it can return to sustained growth.
There has been considerable literature, starting with Frankel and Rose (1996), about
identifying the determinants of currency crises, or at least searching for good indicators
that can help to predict the occurrence of crisis.  Our purpose is different and we take a
different route since we are interested in determining the output costs after a-balance-of
payments crisis has occurred and which factors could help to alleviate these costs.
In this section, we analyze the patterns of adjustment we observe in previous crisis
episodes, and compare the experience of adjusting from currency crises in East Asia and
Latin America. We investigate the factors that help countries avoid the severe output
losses following the crises and return more quickly to the pre-crisis potential growth path.
4.1. Defining Balance-of-Payment Crisis
To examine the nature of adjustments from a crisis, we first need to define what a crisis
actually is. A balance-of-payments crisis is typically defined as an event when an index
of exchange market pressure exceeds a certain threshold. Several alternative indicators
and methods have been used in the literature to identify the dates of currency crises.
Frankel and Rose (1996), Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1998), Barro (2001) and Park and
Lee (2002) use the nominal depreciation rate as the index and date each crisis when the
index increased sharply over an exogenous threshold rate of depreciation common to all
countries.
Severe speculative pressure does not always lead to large depreciations when the authorities
successfully defend the currency by intervening in the foreign exchange market. Hence,
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Glick and
Hutchison (2001) use an alternative indicator of currency pressure by combining
depreciation rates with additional variables such as foreign reserve losses and domestic
interest rate. Then, a balance-of-payments crisis is considered to have occurred if the
composite indicator increased above a threshold level in terms of the country-specific
moments. For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) have constructed the indicator of
currency pressure by a weighted average of monthly nominal depreciation rate and
monthly percentage change of foreign reserve, with weights such that the two
components of the indicator have an equal size in terms of sample volatilities. A balance-
of-payments crisis is then identified to have occurred in the specific year when the
change in the indicator of currency pressure for any month of that year exceeded three
standard deviations above the mean of the indicator over the sample period for each21
country.
8  This procedure is also subject to a potential problem because it implies that, if
the form of the distribution were equally normal but the mean and standard deviations
varied across countries, then the expected number of crises would be the same for all
countries.
Our indicator of currency crises combines two approaches. We define a balance-of-
payments crisis as an episode identified either by the former or the latter approach. For
the former approach, we judge a country to have a balance-of-payments crisis if it
experienced a nominal currency depreciation of at least 25 percent in any quarter of a
specific year and the depreciation rate exceeded that in the previous quarter by a margin of
at least 10 percent.  In applying the criterion in the latter approach, we count those
episodes in which the indicator of currency pressure for any month of that year exceeded
three standard deviations above the mean of the indicator, provided that either the
monthly nominal depreciation rate or percentage change of reserve loss exceeds 10
percent.
We apply the window of three years to isolate independent crises. That is, a balance-of-
payments crisis occurring in that year or three years following the initial crisis is counted
as a continuation of the same crisis rather than a new episode of crisis. Applying this
procedure we identify 260 independent currency crises for 130 countries over the period
from 1970 to 1999.  Out of them, 221 currency crises occurred in developing countries.
Latin American countries have suffered more balance-of-payments crises than East Asia;
55 compared to 14, in the 1970-1999 period. Table 9 shows a summary for the patterns
over time and across regions of our definition of balance of payment crises.
4.2. Overview and the Stylized Patterns of GDP Adjustment during Crisis
Figure 2 shows the movements of real GDP growth rates before and after the currency
crises during the1970 to1999 period. We show the movements of the sample mean of the
GDP growth rate at the onset of the balance-of-payments crisis; in each of the preceding six
years; and in each of the following eight years. For comparison, we include a straight line in
the figure, which indicates the average GDP growth rate during the ‘non-crisis’ period that
was not subject to a crisis in that specific year. We use the sample of developing countries.
We can clearly see that the growth rates show a v-type pattern during the period bordering
the occurrence of a crisis. The growth rates over the six to two preceding years are
comparable to those of non-crisis periods, which is about 3.9 percent in the sample of
developing countries.
9 But thereafter the growth rate starts to decline sharply and reaches the
trough at the crisis year. This v pattern of real GDP adjustment over the period before and
                                                
8 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) tried to exclude the orderly large-scale nominal depreciation in hyper-
inflation countries by separating the sample observations in which inflation in the previous six months was
higher than 150 percent.
9 In order to have updated data up to 2002 (and forecasts for 2003), we use GDP growth rates from IMF,
World Economic Outlook database as of April 2002, rather than per capita GDP from Summers-Heston.
The non-crisis average of per capita GDP growth rates is 2.1% over the sample period.22
following the crisis is broadly consistent with the findings in Gupta et al. (2002), and Park
and Lee (2002). At the trough, the growth rate of all crisis-hit developing countries is about
1.1 percent. But the GDP growth rate recovers its pre-crisis trend level in two or three years
after the outbreak of crisis.
The quick recovery of GDP growth rates to their trend level in the crisis-hit countries is
consistent with the fact that balance-of-payments crises slow down growth rates only
temporarily as we found in the previous section. Thus, when an economy is hit by a
crisis, it tends to recover the potential trend growth rate quickly. Therefore, the level of
the trend growth rates seems to play a critical role for the adjustment pattern.  However,
the recessions caused by balance-of-payments crises must incur permanent output loss
because the post-crisis growth rates do not exceed the pre-crisis period averages, and for this
reason we cannot think of them as output movements around a long-term trend, but as
periods with permanent costs in terms of output and welfare.
Figure 2 shows that the adjustment process in both East Asia and Latin America that can
be inferred from the movements of the growth rates is broadly consistent with the stylized
v-pattern we observe from the all crisis episodes. The mean growth rates hit the bottom at
the time of the crisis or one year after the crisis, and then show the quick recovery over the
following two years. A similar v-type pattern of adjustment in both East Asia and Latin
American crisis episodes suggest that despite the conventional sense of structural
differences between East Asia and Latin America, the pattern of adjustment from crisis is
similar everywhere.
Although the v-shape pattern is similar, the adjustment is much sharper in East Asian
crises than in Latin American crises. The deeper initial contraction following a crisis in
the East Asian countries must be attributed to the severity of the 1997 East Asian crisis.
Figure 3 exhibits the adjustment patterns from crises in East Asian economies. It
confirms that the contraction of real income in the East Asian countries that suffered the
crisis in the 1990s was a lot larger than it was in the previous decades. The five countries
that were most affected by crisis, such as Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia,
and Korea, suffered a sharp decline of real income. In 1998, GDP growth rates of the five
crisis-hit Asian countries plunged sharply from the pre-crisis average of 7.0% to the
negative numbers ranging from –13.1% in Indonesia to –0.8% in the Philippines (see
figure 4).
It is interesting to note the similarities across Asian countries during the crisis.  As figure
4 shows, all of them followed qualitatively the same pattern, and even the figures are
broadly alike.  This indicates that this was a regional phenomenon. Although it is out of
the scope of this paper to measure fundamental vs. self-fulfilling crisis, as well as the
impact of contagion, the similarity suggests that despite having similar fundamental
domestic problems, as discussed below, there were common external shocks, such as
deterioration of business confidence or frantic behavior of financial markets, that explain
the high correlation in the evolution of GDP.23
There are several factors that contributed to the deeper contraction in the 1997 East Asian
crisis.  One important factor is that the 1997 East Asian crisis has an aspect of a severe
liquidity crisis caused by investors’ panic (see Radelet, Sachs and Lee 2001). After
Thailand fell victim to a currency crisis in July 1997, there was rampant speculation that
other East Asian countries might not be able to avoid currency devaluation and debt
default. When foreign investors panicked, capital flows quickly reversed. Over the pre-
crisis period from 1993 to 1996 the five countries had a capital-account surplus of about
7% of GDP on average.  This surplus reversed to 0 in 1997 and to a deficit of 4.8 percent
of GDP over the following 4 years (see Table 10). Thailand experienced a sudden
reversal of about 19 percent of GDP between 1996 and 1997.  This reversal was even
more pronounced in terms of private capital inflows, reaching an adjustment that
amounted to about 23 percent of GDP (from a net inflow of 11 percent in 1996 to a net
outflow of 12 percent in 1997). Official creditors offset only in a small fraction the
reversal of private capital.  In Korea the capital account went from a surplus of 4.6
percent of GDP to a deficit of 1.9 percent.  Net bank lending outflows amounted to 8.3
percent of GDP.
The abrupt reversal of foreign lending led the economies to a sharp liquidity crisis. The
East Asian economies except Malaysia had short-term foreign liabilities larger than
foreign reserves (see table 10). The balance sheets of financial institutions suffered from
currency mismatch. By mid-June of 1997, the foreign liabilities of the banking sector
exceeded its foreign assets, ranging from 1.3 in Korea to 6.8 in Thailand. Maturity
mismatches also created another vulnerability. Korean data shows that short-term foreign
liabilities of the banking sector were more than twice as large as short-term foreign assets
(Park and Lee 2002). It is no wonder that the large unexpected currency depreciation and
financial distress provoked deep contractions.  In East Asia, the adverse impact was
amplified because most firms were highly leveraged. The firms that were highly
leveraged with large amounts of short-term liabilities faced more difficulties in financing
and were unable to service their debts. Bankruptcies soared, and investment collapsed.  In
Korea investment rate dropped from 33.4 percent in 1997 to 22.0 percent in 1998.
Following the deeper initial contraction, however, the East Asian economies returned
quickly to the pre-crisis trend growth in just two years. The speedy recovery confirms the
typical v-type adjustment pattern.  The strong recovery of the East Asian economies is
also attributed to some additional factors including their export-oriented structure and
swift adjustment of macroeconomic policies.
10  It is one of the stylized facts from
previous crisis episodes that the external sector has led the recovery and contributed to
the sharp turnaround in GDP growth.  A large real exchange rate depreciation following a
currency crisis has a strong impact on post-crisis export growth. As the East Asian
economies are more export oriented, they benefited more from their increasing export
competitiveness following the substantial real exchange rate depreciation after the crisis.
The level of openness in terms of the share of exports and imports in GDP ranges from
200 percent in Malaysia to 60 percent in Indonesia.
                                                
10 Park and Lee (2002) provide detailed analysis of the adjustment and recovery from 1997 East Asian
crisis.24
The sharp depreciation that these economies faced led to a moderate increase in inflation
in 1998 and large gains in competitiveness.  Thereafter, inflation subdued to pre-crisis,
and even lower, levels.  The only exception was Indonesia where inflation went up to 58
percent in 1998, and still 20 percent in 1999.  In this high inflation environment,
Indonesia was also the economy with the lowest rate of growth in the two years following
the crisis (table 10).
Another special feature of the East Asia crisis is that compared to the cross-country
evidence, the impact of depreciation on real output showed up as early as one year after
the crisis. The large real exchange depreciation therefore restored external balance
without much delay in East Asia. The flexibility in the labor market may have helped to
facilitate this swift adjustment. The shift of labor resources from the non-tradables to the
tradables sector was relatively easier with the flexible factor markets. The adjustment of
the private sector under the changed macroeconomic circumstances tends to be much
quicker. In Korea, for example, the growth rate of the nominal wage, which used to be
about 10% per year, dropped sharply after the crisis. In 1998, the nominal and the real
wage rate decreased by 2.5 and 10 percent, respectively. The freeze in nominal wages in
Korea in 1998 was not due solely to the decline in labor demand after the crisis. It was
also due to a temporary negotiation in the Tripartite Committee, which consists of
representatives from the government, labor unions and employers’ organizations (Lee and
Rhee, 2001).
The quick improvement in East Asian exports was supported by swift adjustment of
macroeconomic policies. After the onset of the crisis, implementation of tight
stabilization policies as well as financial restructuring supported by the IMF reinforced
the contractionary effects of the crisis.
11 Although tight macroeconomic policy might be
unavoidable in order to stem capital outflows and to prevent depreciation-inflation
spirals, their contractionary impacts were much larger than had been expected by anyone,
including the IMF. Starting in the middle of 1998, the East Asian countries began to
change their monetary and fiscal policy stance toward expansion. Evidence shows that
easing of monetary and fiscal policy quickened the pace of recovery in the East Asian
countries, particularly in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand (see Park and Lee, 2002).
The Latin American experience has been very different to that of Asia.  In the last 25
years, Latin America has suffered two crisis periods.  The first one was the debt crisis in
the early eighties that hit most of the region about the same time and then a sequence of
crises during the nineties that started with Mexico in 1994 and the aftershocks to the
whole region, especially Argentina, which was able to keep convertibility but faced a
financial crisis.  Later on, with the Asian and subsequent Russian crisis, Brazil had a
currency crisis at the end of 1999, growth in the whole region declined and finally came
the crisis in Argentina.  The Brazilian depreciation was one of the main, or perhaps the
final, ingredients for the collapse of Argentina’s convertibility in 2001.
                                                
11 See World Bank (2000), Borensztein and Lee (2002), Park (2001), and Park and Lee (2002) for the
detailed discussion of the process of macroeconomic adjustment and financial restructuring policies in the
1997 East Asian crisis.   25
The debt crisis in Latin America is the most similar to the Asian crisis in terms of its
timing. Although the initial shock in each case was not the same, the causes,
consequences and outcome show some similarities.  In the case of Asia, the crisis started
with Thailand’s currency crisis.  In Latin America, the beginning of the crisis is traced to
August 1982, when Mexico announced that it could not meet its foreign obligations, after
the sharp increase in world interest rates caused by the tightening of monetary policy by
the Fed under the chairmanship of Paul Volcker.
12 It is possible to find many similarities
between both crises, especially since they were both regional crises.  However, what is
striking when comparing figures 4 and 5, is that the evolution of the economies were very
different. The extent of the collapse, the previous evolution of output, and the post-crisis
recovery are quite heterogeneous in Latin America, as summarized with the four largest
countries.
One important difference between the Asian crisis and the debt crisis is that in the former
a large fiscal imbalance in most of the countries was the cause of the large foreign
indebtedness and the further collapse. What has been highlighted in the Asian crisis, as
well as the Chilean crisis of 1982 and Mexican crisis in 1994, was that its origin was not
a fiscal imbalance.  Indeed, of all the experiences of Table 10, only Chile (1982) and
Mexico (1994) had a fiscal surplus the year before the crisis.  The expanding current
account deficit and the resulting increase in net foreign liabilities was mainly due to the
decisions of the private sector which, faced with a liquidity squeeze, was unable to pay
foreign creditors.  However, as Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) argue, the
implicit bailout to failing banks, which actually took place, should also be considered a
fiscal imbalance.  This fiscal imbalance was not in the official accounts, but in the form
of a contingent liability.
Chile is perhaps the closest predecessor to the crisis of the 90s.  It is also interesting to
note that the GDP adjustment in the 1980s in Chile has a very similar pattern to that of
the Asian crisis.  The causes were similar.  A strong fiscal position, running a budget
surplus of 2.4% of GDP in 1981, which later deteriorated significantly as a result of the
bailout of banks and declining revenues stemming from recession.  The current account
deficit in 1981 rose to an unprecedented level of 15% of GDP.  This deficit, rather than
financing investment, financed basically an increase in consumption, with a sharp
reduction of national savings. On the other hand, the increase in investment was mainly
in non-tradables, mostly construction.  This was the consequence of financial
liberalization and the fixing of the exchange rate from June 1979 until June 1982.  The
real exchange rate appreciated and it was clearly misaligned by 1981. Starting at a value
of 100 in 1978, the real exchange rate index declined (appreciated) by 36 percent until
1981, and then recovered as a result of a sharp depreciation.  Since, the authorities had
stated for a long time that the exchange rate was irrevocably fixed, the banking system
was mismatched in terms of currencies and maturity.  There was no good supervision and
                                                
12 This is clearly a major shock, but countries like Chile, for example, were suffering an Asian-type
currency crisis, which started in June 1982.  For more details on the debt crisis see Edwards (1995), ch. 2.26
there were clear signals that banks in trouble would be bailed out.  In addition, the links
between the banking system and the corporate sector increased financial fragility.
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The main difference between Chile and East Asia was the evolution of inflation which
was at an annual 20% or more, except in the year of recession when it was 13 percent,
illustrating that the decline in the rate of inflation in the year of the crisis was more linked
to the fixed  exchange rate and the decline in output rather than to a reduction in long-
term inflation.
It is interesting to note that Chile in the 1982 crisis and Mexico in the 1994 crisis, are the
two Latin American countries with a v-shape pattern of adjustment most similar to those
of Asia, and similar to those of the broad evolution of GDP shown in Figure 1.  One
could argue that the private origin of the massive crisis with a strong initial fiscal position
may allow for an orderly, although costly, resolution of the financial crisis.
Except in the case of Colombia, short-term debt was usually a problem in Latin America,
where short-term liabilities were from 2 to 6 times larger than reserves, and hence faced
serious liquidity problems.
In addition, the sharp depreciation that theses countries experienced after the crisis may
have helped them to recover more quickly, as also happened in Asia.  Indeed, comparing
the debt crisis in Latin America, Edwards (1995) shows that between 1982 and 1987
Chile’s depreciation was about 90%, while in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico it was in the
order of 20-30%.   In addition, in the late 1980s the inflationary problems of Argentina
and Brazil led them to adopt heterodox disinflation policies, which boiled down to price
controls without fiscal adjustment, and as expected, they were a complete failure, a final
touch to the lost decade.
Latin America during the nineties has suffered from currency crises, but their timing is
not the same, the characteristics are not the same, neither are their causes.  Therefore,
when examining the growth experience, it is difficult to attribute them to a common
cause, such as the implementation of reforms, as those who argue against reform would
support, or to a bad external environment.
The first crisis of the 90s started with Mexico’s tequila crisis, which then dragged
Argentina into a financial crisis.  Argentina was able to keep convertibility, at a severe
cost in terms of output.  Both countries followed a v-shape adjustment.  However,
Argentina recovered until 1998, but concurrently with the Asian crisis started the
deterioration of economic conditions again, which lead to the collapse of convertibility in
2001.  Brazil and Chile were also hit hard by external conditions.  Brazil, after struggling
to avoid a currency crisis, had one after the Russian crisis--which is singled out as the
most proximate cause of Brazil’s crisis--at the end of 1999.  If we consider currency
depreciation and loss of reserves, Chile did not have a currency crisis in the late 90s.  But,
the interest rate defense to strong currency pressures in 1998 would, in a broader
                                                
13 It is also interesting to note, as emphasized by Edwards (1999), Chile had capital controls in 1982, more
stringent than the famous controls of the nineties, but this did not avoid the currency crisis.27
definition, makes that episode close to a currency crisis.  In Argentina, as a result of the
appreciation of the dollar in international markets, its dollar-pegged currency and the
depreciation of Brazil’s real there was growing pressure on Argentina’s peso, which
finally collapsed in December 2001. Since the late 90s all Latin American countries have
been struggling to return to higher growth, but as shown in the previous section, their
growth prospects are definitely lower than Asia’s.
By contrast, the quick turnaround of the East Asian economy from the 1997 crisis has
brightened the region’s economic prospects. As the recovery continues in East Asia, these
economies seem to return to sustained growth.  Despite the impressive record of the
recovery, however, not everyone is confident about East Asia’s future prospects. The
long-term sustained growth in East Asia is no guarantee that the countries will not be
susceptible to a severe crisis again.   Asian countries still face challenges to increase
resilience to crisis, especially in the financial sector.
5. Determinants of Output Cost of Crisis
In this subsection, we formally investigate the factors that determine the magnitude of
output losses accompanying a crisis.  We examine which kind of initial conditions, policy
reactions and external conditions help to reduce the cost of crisis.
We measure the output cost of a crisis by the cumulative loss in output growth during the
period from the year when the crisis began until the time when output growth returned to
its trend.
14 As a first step, we define the period of crisis as three years—the crisis year and
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where t indicates the year in which a crisis occurred. The variable trend represents the
trend GDP growth rate.  This trend is calculated using the average GDP growth rate
                                                
14 This measure must be viewed as an indicator of output losses associated with a crisis, but not necessarily
caused by the crisis. Lower output growth during recession may trigger a balance-of-payments crisis, which
in turn aggravate the recession. IMF (1998) and Eichengreen and Bordo (2001) have used the same output
cost to measure the cost of crises.  In the latter case, the output loss is measured until output returns to
trend, whereas we fix a 3-year period.  The figures, however, yield similar results for the output cost of a
crisis, since the recovery time is about 2 to 4 years. Alternatively, the output cost of a crisis can be
measured by the cumulative loss in output during the crisis years.  In order to construct this, we need to
have the measure of potential output. If we assume that the potential output of each country increases from
the pre-crisis equilibrium by the rate of the non-crisis trend growth, we have constructed the potential
output over the 3 years following a crisis and measured the output cost of a crisis by the sum of log
differences between the potential output and potential output over the three years. The estimation results
based on this cost measure, which can be provided upon request to the authors, are very similar to those
reported in this section.  28
during the “non-crisis” period that is, a year in which the country was not subject to a
crisis and the preceding two years.  So for each country this is the average rate of growth
during the non-crisis year, where crisis consists of a 3-year period.
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According to this definition, the average output cost per crisis from 1970 to 1999 was
about 5.8 percentage points for an average developing country. Note that this figure is
consistent with our estimations of section 3, where we found that a crisis reduces growth
by 1.7% per annum during a five-year period.  Since we identify the crisis for three years
this is about 5% less output.  However, the standard deviation of the output cost of crisis
is considerably large: 11 percentage points. This implies that each crisis episode had
different characteristics in terms of its origin, evolution, and policy responses. In fact, not
every crisis episode was associated with output loss: it turned out that output was
expansionary in about 30 percent of all crisis episodes.  A well-known case is the crisis of
the European Monetary System in 1992, where most countries hit by the crisis grew
strongly afterwards. During the same period from 1970 to 1999, the average output cost
was about 8.9 percentage points on average for Latin American crises and about 10.4
percentage points for an average East Asian crisis for Latin American countries an
average developing country
We believe there are a large number of factors that brought about the differences in
output cost in the crisis-hit countries. Nature of the shock, initial conditions, external
environments, and policy responses must influence the behavior of output following a
crisis. For the purpose of our empirical investigation we classify those factors into two
broad categories— pre-crisis and post-crisis factors.
Regarding the pre-crisis factors we include (i) pre-crisis GDP growth rate, (ii)
international liquidity, measured by an indicator of reserve adequacy, and (iii) banking
sector soundness. Real GDP growth rate prior to the crisis can provide information about
the degree of imbalances in an economy; in particular we focus our attention on GDP
growth compared to its trend rate of growth. If an economy has high GDP growth rate
with respect to trend prior to a crisis it is likely to be in an over-expansion, and therefore
the crisis will not only have traditional disruptive effects on economic activities, but will
also help to bring output closer to its normal levels. For example, previous studies have
shown that lending booms and excessive credit expansion during the pre-crisis periods
tended to deepen the post-crisis recession and reduce growth (De Gregorio and Guidotti,
1995, and Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco, 1996). In addition, high-growth countries may be
more vulnerable to a severe shock, thereby having a larger output loss following a crisis.
Adequate international liquidity of an economy is also important to dampen the shock of
a currency crisis. Lack of foreign reserves has often resulted in a sharp liquidity crisis and
a deep contraction of real output. As a measure of international liquidity, we use the size
of foreign reserves relative to broad money supply (M2). We also consider the ratio of
                                                
15 For an alternative measure of the trend growth rate, we have considered the predicted growth rate
coming from the specification 1 of table 3 in section 3. The estimation results based on this measure are
broadly similar to those reported in this section. But, the sample size becomes much smaller.29
foreign reserves to short-term foreign debt as an alternative measure.
A sound banking sector is also important to prevent illiquidity. The vulnerability of the
banking sector often magnifies a shock. In particular, when a currency crisis is associated
with a systematic banking crisis, it becomes more costly.  These are the “twin crises” that
exacerbate the costs of currency crises.  Indeed, one mechanism through which currency
crisis harms the economy is the balance sheet effects on the corporate and the banking
sectors due to maturity and currency mismatches, very common in the East Asian crisis
of 1997 and in many of the Latin American experiences. Hence, we include a banking
crisis variable as an important factor that affects the severity of the balance-of-payments
crisis. The data on banking crises are compiled from Caprio and Klingebiel (1996),
Demirguc and Detragiache (1998), and Glick and Hutchison (2001), who documented the
episodes of bank insolvencies based on both quantitative and qualitative criteria. The
dummy for banking crises is an episode that a currency crisis in a specific year was
preceded by a banking crisis during the previous two years or followed by a banking
crisis in the next two years.
Regarding post-crisis factors, there are a number of characteristics that can affect the
costs of a crisis.  Following the discussion of the East Asian and Latin American
experiences in the previous section, we consider that the important post-crisis factors
include (i) world GDP growth, (ii) real exchange rate depreciation, and (iii)
macroeconomic policies.
A global economic environment is important to the post-crisis adjustment of crisis-hit
countries. Strong world growth has a positive effect on export growth and helps the
crisis-hit countries to recover quickly, by improvements in terms of trade and increasing
market access for their exports.  The size of initial real exchange depreciation following a
crisis can also influence export and output growth in the post-crisis period.  It is
important to distinguish a nominal from a real depreciation, and indeed, it must not be
automatically assumed that letting the currency weaken will necessarily result in a real
depreciation.  However, evidence suggests that after a currency crisis occurs, the pass-
through from exchange rate to inflation is relatively small, but some suitable domestic
conditions are needed.
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Macroeconomic adjustment policies implemented by the government for crisis
management are also an important factor for the post-crisis recovery of real output. Fiscal
and monetary policies can play a critical role in fostering the recovery, and of course,
they have been at the center of many policy discussions on the appropriate mix to adjust
efficiently to currency crisis.  For example, during the Asian crisis a major issue of
discussion was the role of expansionary fiscal policy and the need to tighten monetary
policy at the beginning of the crisis in order to establish credibility and avoid excessive
currency depreciation.
17  It is out of the scope of this paper to analyze the very short-term
                                                
16 Borenzstein and De Gregorio (1999) for example show that the pass-through is smaller in countries that
had low inflation previous to the currency crisis.
17 See Fischer (1998) and Stiglitz (2002) for contrasting views.30
policy reaction to a crisis, since this framework allows us to shed light on the overall
policy stance during the period and its impact on recovery.
To the extent that the relevant data are available, we carry out an empirical assessment of
the factors determining the output cost of balance-of-payments crises. Using the complete
data from 1975 to 1998, we set up a basic equation as follows (a subscript s~v, means
average for the period from s to v):
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where e is the random disturbance term.
Table 11 provides the estimation results. We have also included dummies for the decades
of 1980s and 1990s in order to control unobserved period-specific shocks.
Column 1 shows that all explanatory variables enter with expected signs. We find a
strong and statistically significant positive relation between the pre-crisis GDP growth
and the output cost of a crisis. This can imply that a country with high growth relative to
its trend, that is an economy that is overheating, prior to a crisis tends to have larger
decline in GDP growth over the three years following the crisis. The estimated coefficient
(0.660, s.e.=0.253) implies that one-percentage-point higher growth rate in the pre-crisis
period tends to increase the accumulated output cost by about 0.7 percentage points in the
crisis-hit economy.  As expected, the crisis tends to eliminate, although not completely,
this “excess growth.”
Adequate international liquidity, which is measured as a ratio of foreign reserve to money
supply, prior to a crisis is estimated to decrease the output cost of the crisis. The
estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  The
estimated coefficient (-0.146, s.e.=0.042) implies that a 25 percentage point increase
(standard-deviation) in the foreign reserve-to-M2 ratio lowers the output cost by about
3.6 percentage points.
A dummy variable for the occurrence of banking crises is positive and statistically
significant. The estimated coefficient (0.076, s.e. = 0.020) implies that when a balance-
of-payments crisis is accompanied by a banking crisis, the output loss increases
substantially by 7.6 percentage point. Roughly, we could say that on average a twin crisis
is almost like two currency crises in terms of output costs.
The results also show that several factors in the post-crisis period have strong effects on
output cost. The world growth variable, which is an average of GDP growth rates of a
crisis-hit country’s trading partners weighted by its trade share, turns out to have a31
significant effect on crisis cost. The estimated coefficient (-2.74, s.e.=0.96) implies that a
one percentage point increase in world GDP growth rate per year is associated with about
2.7 percentage points decline in output cost of the crisis over the three years following the
crisis.  Note that the size of the coefficient in terms of annual growth rate is closer to one,
since a one percentage point rise in world growth reduces the costs in terms of output by
2.7 percentage points over three years.
The results also confirm that real exchange depreciation helps to reduce the output cost. 
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The estimated coefficient on real exchange depreciation variable is negative and
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The estimated coefficient (-0.035,
s.e.=0.016) shows that a real exchange depreciation of 70 percentage points (its standard
deviation) lessens the decline of GDP growth rate by about 2.4 percentage points over the
three years after the crisis.
Column 1 includes average growth rates of real money supply as the macroeconomic
policy variable. The monetary policy variable turns out to have significant effects on the
output cost of crisis. The estimated coefficient (-0.129, s.e.=0.066) implies that a 10
percentage point increase in real money supply over the post-crisis period leads to a 1.3
percentage point drop in the output cost. Hence, post-crisis expansionary monetary policy
helps to alleviate the output cost of a crisis.   
In contrast to the positive and significant contribution of monetary policy, fiscal policy
turns out to have a negligible effect on the cost of currency crisis. In column 1, we add
the budget balance variable as a measure of fiscal policy stance. The estimated coefficient
for budget balance variable is positive, suggesting that fiscal deficit tends to lower the
output cost, but it is statistically insignificant.
The dummy variables, although significant, conform the presumption that the crises of
the 1980s were more costly.  By comparing the parameter estimates, the higher cost of a
crisis in the 1980s is about half percent of GDP.
Column 2 uses the ratio of foreign reserves to short-term debt as an alternative measure
of international liquidity. This measure also has a negative relationship to the output cost
of the crisis, and the estimated coefficient is marginally statistically significant at the 10%
level.
Column 3 concerns the possible endogeneity problem of monetary growth. The negative
correlation between real money supply growth and output cost may come from the
positive effect of output growth on money demand, and an accommodation from the
supply-side, rather than the reverse. In order to avoid this problem, we use the growth of
the real money-to-GDP ratio (M/PY), the inverse of velocity, as a measure of
expansionary monetary policy. We still find that expansionary monetary policy tends to
                                                
18 Note that the variable is the rate of real depreciation in the first year of the crisis, which can be less
subject to the problem of reverse causality.32
lower the output cost of crisis. However, the estimated coefficient (-0.046, s.e.=0.071) is
not statistically significant.
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In sum, the results suggest that adequate international liquidity, real exchange rate
depreciation and sound banking system play a critical role in avoiding severe shocks from
a crisis.  A good external environment also speeds up recovery, limiting the cost of crisis.
We have also found some relevant effects of expansionary monetary policy in dampening
the crisis cost, but no significant effect of fiscal policy.
However, this does not have a straightforward implication for macroeconomic policies.
In many cases, countries attempting to conduct expansionary macroeconomic policies
may not be able to. For example, the procyclicality of fiscal policy in Latin America
occurs due to the inability of government to borrow during bad times (Perotti and Gavin,
1997).  Along the same lines, a central bank that lacks credibility may end up being
unable to conduct an expansionary, non-inflationary monetary policy.  Therefore, the
result could also be due to the institutional capability of countries to implement
countercyclical macroeconomic policies.  What our results show is that in past
experiences of currency crisis, monetary policy has been more effective in alleviating
their output costs.
6. Conclusions
We have compared the experience of growth performance and macroeconomic
adjustment between East Asia and Latin America.  We have focused the analysis on 9
East Asian economies and 21 in Latin America.  The cross-country regression highlights
the role of investment, human resources, fertility, and institutional and policy factors that
have made the potential growth rate of East Asia higher than that of Latin America over
the 1970-2000 period.
We find that convergence effects due to the difference in initial income or external shock
to terms of trade did not play a quantitatively important role in explaining lower growth
in the Latin American region.  This finding is important since the rationale for the inward
looking trade strategy followed in Latin America since the 60s was based on the belief
that Latin America would suffer from deteriorating terms of trade, which ex-post proved
to be wrong.  In this respect, among policy and institutional factors the most important
difference between Latin America and East Asia has been the larger degree of openness
of the latter. Balance-of-payments crisis shocks have contributed to the differences of
growth performance across regions, although this difference shrank during the 90s as a
result of the Asian crisis of 1997.
                                                
19 Fiscal balance can be also procyclical and thereby subject to the possible endogeneity problem. But, the
positive estimated coefficient on fiscal balance implies that this endogeneity problem is of little concern.
We also used the ratio of real government consumption to GDP as a measure of fiscal policy stance. Since
government expenditure is considered to be less elastic to the cycle than revenues, the potential
endogeneity problem would be smaller. The government consumption variable also turns out to be
statistically insignificant.33
Low investment rates in Latin America were also important in explaining the differences
with East Asia.  In addition, high fertility rates, low quality of human resources, mainly in
terms of schooling, high government consumption, and low indices for the rule of law,
are all factors that have contributed to the low growth in Latin America vis-à-vis East
Asia.
The quality of education, measured by results in international test scores, also shows
Latin America substantially behind Asia. However, we cannot estimate its quantitative
impact due to the lack of long time series, and this is an issue that deserves further
examination.
Another important difference across regions is income distribution.  We report some
preliminary evidence, which suggests that some of the differences of institutions and
policies are the results of the differences in income distribution.  This is the case of
fertility, government consumption, secondary school enrollment and rule of law.
Using the regression results we estimate growth prospects for both regions and find that
the differences should decrease, due to a large extent to an unfavorable convergence
effect for Asia, but also due to some progress made in institutions and policies. There still
remains a significant gap in terms of investment, fertility, schooling and openness.  In any
event, Latin America is predicted to grow on a per-capita basis at an average of 2.3%
during this decade, while East Asia could grow at 3.8%.
We also analyze the pattern of recession and recovery from balance-of-payment crises
and find that the adjustment process in both East Asia and Latin America is broadly
consistent with the stylized v-pattern we observe in all crisis episodes around the world.
However, one characteristic that differentiates some Latin American countries from Asia,
is the addiction of the former to get out of one crisis only to fall into another. This
recurrence of balance-of-payment crisis still needs further explanations.  One exception
has been the Chilean case, which in the 80s suffered a crisis very similar to those of
Asian economies in 1997.  Although the origins may have been different, the crisis
occurred simultaneously with a severe banking crisis.  But, they also occurred with sound
fiscal policy and the exchange rate declined sharply.  In addition, the Chilean economy as
well as Asian economies is sufficiently open to recover through export expansion.
We look at a sample of 81 episodes in order to identify factors that could reduce the
output cost of crisis. As an external factor we find that a good international environment
reduces the costs.  At the other extreme we find that sound banking is very important,
since the output costs of twin-crisis (balance of payments plus banking) is about twice the
cost of balance-of-payment crisis alone.  In addition, having international liquidity before
the crisis, measured by international reserves as a ratio of M2, reduces the cost of crisis.
In terms of policy response, our results indicate that a real exchange rate depreciation and
expansionary monetary policy help in the recovery, while fiscal policy has no effects.
Further work could try to uncover the conditions that generate effective expansionary34
macroeconomic policies to increase resilience to bad external environment and to
improve the quality of the adjustment.
For example, in terms of achieving real exchange rate and relative price adjustment, real
wages must generally fall.  The wage agreements achieved in Korea were important to
achieve this goal.  Again, we suspect the differences in income inequality across regions
may affect the likelihood of reaching such agreements.  This could also help to explain
the lack of full adjustment in Latin America, which paves the way for the next crisis, or
for muddling through.35
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Table 1: Economic Growth in East Asia and Latin America
















China 682 3747 5.50 1.79 2.72 5.14 7.41 4.26 5.09
Hong Kong 3090 26703 8.64 7.45 6.59 5.04 2.48 5.39 4.70
Indonesia 936 3637 3.89 1.50 5.56 4.08 2.45 3.40 4.03
Korea 1495 15881 10.62 5.97 5.68 7.32 4.67 5.91 5.89
Malaysia 2119 9937 4.69 3.08 5.26 2.92 4.19 3.86 4.12
Philippines 2015 3424 1.70 1.73 3.17 -0.89 1.30 1.33 1.19
Singapore 2161 27186 12.58 8.93 7.76 4.48 4.16 6.33 5.47
Taiwan 1430 18718 13.09 6.68 7.44 6.27 5.36 6.44 6.35
Thailand 1091 6857 6.28 5.13 4.05 5.71 3.50 4.60 4.42
EAST ASIA (9) Av. 1669 12899 7.44 4.69 5.36 4.45 3.95 4.61 4.58
Argentina 7371 10995 1.49 2.29 1.38 -3.87 4.22 1.00 0.57
Bolivia 2354 2722 1.16 0.60 2.01 -2.22 1.08 0.37 0.29
Brazil 2371 7185 3.03 4.23 5.67 -0.26 1.46 2.77 2.29
Chile 3853 9920 2.57 2.19 1.22 1.28 4.79 2.37 2.43
Colombia 2530 5380 2.13 2.23 3.11 1.35 0.87 1.89 1.78
Costa Rica 3476 5863 1.69 1.85 2.59 -0.94 1.75 1.31 1.13
Dominican Republic 1695 5271 3.11 1.75 3.69 0.80 5.12 2.84 3.20
Ecuador 2004 3467 1.73 1.35 6.16 -1.17 -0.85 1.37 1.38
El Salvador 3310 4435 1.34 2.24 0.05 -1.66 2.30 0.73 0.23
Guatemala 2344 3914 1.67 2.44 3.05 -1.21 0.84 1.28 0.90
Haiti 1065 1658 1.56 -1.03 1.78 -2.50 6.51 1.19 1.93
Honduras 1700 2054 1.21 0.91 2.03 -0.25 -0.82 0.47 0.32
Jamaica 2746 3692 1.34 3.43 -1.14 1.72 -1.05 0.74 -0.16
Mexico 3980 8766 2.20 3.28 3.27 -0.43 1.78 1.97 1.54
Nicaragua 2877 1767 0.61 3.25 -2.70 -3.00 -2.42 -1.22 -2.71
Panama 2325 6066 2.61 4.98 3.35 -0.69 1.96 2.40 1.54
Paraguay 2425 4682 1.93 1.70 4.46 1.01 -0.58 1.64 1.63
Peru 3228 4583 1.42 3.73 0.45 -3.13 2.47 0.88 -0.07
Trinidad &Tobago 4370 11148 2.55 4.10 3.77 -0.90 2.43 2.35 1.76
Uruguay 5874 9613 1.64 0.43 2.70 -1.00 2.81 1.23 1.50
Venezuela 7841 6420 0.82 2.95 -2.79 -1.36 -0.80 -0.50 -1.65
Latin America (21) Av. 3321 5695 1.81 2.33 2.10 -0.80 1.61 1.29 0.94
Japan 4545 24672 5.43 9.27 3.09 3.53 1.05 4.23 2.55
USA 12273 33308 2.71 2.87 2.66 2.16 2.30 2.50 2.37
World (85) Average 3823 7503 1.96 2.53 1.99 0.98 1.32 1.70 1.43
Note: Per capita GDP levels and growth rates are based on 1996 international (purchasing power parity
adjusted) prices, based on the Penn World Tables 6.1.
Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).40









Per capita GDP growth 0.025 0.048 0.021
Per capita GDP in 1970 5472 2922 4273
Investment/GDP 0.190 0.216 0.145
Fertility rate in 1970 4.9 4.8 5.5
Schooling in 1970 1.21 1.37 0.83
Life expectancy in 1970 64.0 64.8 65.1
Government consumption /GDP 0.094 0.050 0.102
Rule-of-law index 0.560 0.611 0.381
Inflation 0.127 0.105 0.202
Democracy index 0.516 0.346 0.479
Openness -0.006 0.324 -0.147
Terms of trade -0.021 0.003 -0.009
Balance-of-payments crisis 0.26 0.22 0.29
1995-2000 Period
Per capita GDP growth 0.018 0.025 0.011
Per capita GDP in 1995 9205 11291 5301
Investment/GDP 0.168 0.270 0.150
Fertility rate in 1995 3.2 2.2 3.2
Schooling in 1995 2.43 3.17 1.81
Life expectancy in 1995 68.9 71.8 70.7
Government consumption /GDP 0.077 0.071 0.106
Rule-of-law index 0.707 0.781 0.559
Inflation 0.080 0.044 0.114
Democracy index 0.680 0.500 0.732
Openness -0.022 0.689 -0.207
Terms of trade -0.012 0.006 -0.012
Balance-of-payments crisis 0.24 0.56 0.14
Notes: see next page.41
Notes to Table 2
The sample consists of the 85 countries that are used in the regressions in table 3.
Per capita GDP levels and growth rates are based on 1996 international (purchasing
power parity adjusted) prices, based on the World Tables 6.1, as described in Summers
and Heston (1991) and Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  
Schooling data is the average years of male secondary and higher schooling from
Barro and Lee (2001). The investment ratio is the ratio of real investment (private plus
public) to real GDP, based on the World Tables 6.1, averaged over the period. The
government consumption measure is the ratio of real government consumption (exclusive
of spending on education and defense) to GDP, based on the World Tables 6.1.  The rule-
of-law index, expressed on a zero-to-one scale, with one being the most favorable, is
based on the International Country Risk Guide’s maintenance of the rule of law index.
The inflation rate is the growth rate over each period of a consumer price index. The
democracy index, expressed on a zero-to-one scale, with one being the most favorable, is
based on the indicator of political rights compiled by Freedom House. The openness
variable is the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, filtered for the estimated effects on
this measure from the logs of population and area. The growth rate of the terms of trade is
the change of export over import prices over the period. The balance-of-payments-crisis
variable is described in the notes to table 7. The nine East Asian economies are: China,
Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines. The 21 Latin American countries are listed in table 1.42
Table 3.  Cross-Country Panel Regressions for Per Capita GDP Growth Rate



























































































































Group of 9 East
Asian countries
-- -- -- 0.0106
(0.0056)
Group of 21 Latin
American countries
-- -- -- -0.0033
(0.0041)
No. of countries 85 85 85 85
No. of observations 464 464 391 464
     Notes: see next page.43
Notes to Table 3
The system has six equations, corresponding to the periods 1970-75, 1975-80,
1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-95, and 1995-2000. Column 3 omits the 1970-1975 period in
order to include the lagged value of the  balance-of-payments-crisis variable.  The
dependent variables are the growth rates of per capita GDP. Data on GDP are from Penn-
World Tables version 6.1.
The log of per capita GDP,  the average years of male secondary and higher
schooling, and the log of life expectancy at age one are measured at the beginning of each
period.  The ratios of government consumption and investment to GDP, the inflation rate,
the total fertility rate, the growth rate of the terms of trade, and the democracy index are
period averages.  The rule-of-law index is the earliest value available (for 1982 or 1985)
in the first three equations and the period average for the other equations. The openness
variable is the period average.
Estimation is by three-stage least squares.   Instruments are the actual values of
the variables for schooling, life expectancy, openness, and the terms of trade; dummy
variables for Spanish or Portuguese colonies and other colonies (which have substantial
explanatory power for inflation); lagged values of the log of per capita GDP, the
government consumption ratio, and the investment ratio; and the initial values for each
period of the rule-of-law index and democracy index.  In the first two equations, the
instrument for the rule-of-law indicator is its values for 1982 or 1985.  The initial values
of foreign reserve-import ratio are used as an instrument for balance-of-payments crisis.
Individual constants (not shown) are included for each period.  Standard errors of the
coefficient estimates are shown in parentheses.44
Table 4. Contributions to Growth Differentials Between East Asia and Latin
America, 1970-2000 (percent, annual average)
Contributions to the difference in per capita GDP
growth of East Asia relative to Latin America
1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 1970-2000
Difference in
Actual Growth 3.26 5.33 2.29 3.62
Predicted Growth 3.40 3.97 1.87 3.08 (100%)
Initial Income 0.91 -0.05 -1.28 -0.14 (-4.5%)
Investment Rate 0.43 0.65 0.73 0.60 (19.6%)
Fertility 0.31 0.56 0.63 0.50 (16.3%)
Human Resources 0.14 0.28 0.45 0.29 ( 9.4%)
Schooling 0.17 0.20 0.34 0.24
Life Expectancy -0.03 0.08 0.11 0.05
Institutions and Policy 1.46 1.95 1.29 1.57 (50.8%)
Government Consumption 0.40 0.32 0.22 0.31
Rule of Law 0.41 0.32 0.37 0.37
Inflation Rate 0.16 0.55 0.22 0.31
Democracy 0.04 0.12 -0.27 -0.04
Openness 0.45 0.65 0.75 0.62
Terms of trade 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 (0.7%)
Balance-of-payments Crisis 0.14 0.54 0.04 0.24 (7.8%)
Note: Our sample includes the nine East Asian economies and 21 Latin American countries listed in
table 1. The predicted per capita growth rate is based on the estimation result of column (2) in table 3.45






























Argentina 4.00 4.70 1.8 0.40 0.06 0.18 1.89 0.02 0.24 1.03 -0.14 0.73 0.02 0.7
Brazil 2.28 4.61 0.6 0.21 0.25 0.32 2.12 0.69 0.04 1.15 -0.33 0.57 0.08 0.9
Chile 2.14 2.62 0.5 0.54 -0.01 0.04 1.30 0.36 -0.23 0.39 0.23 0.56 0.12 0.4
Colombia 2.79 2.37 -0.1 0.72 0.30 0.22 1.41 0.24 0.65 0.16 -0.29 0.64 0.02 -0.2
Dominican
Republic 1.37 0.84 -1.1 0.61 0.53 0.33 0.70 0.06 0.19 0.09 -0.24 0.59 0.03 -0.2
Haiti 2.64 2.79 -3.7 1.09 0.89 0.46 3.06 0.56 0.87 0.06 0.74 0.83 0.03 -0.2
Mexico 3.03 3.19 1.1 0.37 0.56 0.17 0.46 -0.10 0.12 0.27 -0.37 0.54 0.03 0.7
Panama 3.03 2.16 0.2 0.24 0.32 0.04 1.83 0.47 0.60 -0.05 0.31 0.50 -0.01 -0.2
Peru 4.64 4.14 0.0 0.43 0.59 0.04 2.02 -0.12 0.58 0.79 0.11 0.66 0.07 0.7
Venezuela 6.22 2.81 1.4 0.43 0.47 0.23 0.57 -0.18 0.09 0.19 -0.07 0.55 -0.18 0.1
21Latin Amer-
ican countries 3.62 3.08 -0.1 0.60 0.50 0.24 1.57 0.31 0.37 0.31 -0.04 0.62 0.02 0.2
Notes: 
1 Difference between each country's (predicted) per capita growth rate and the (predicted) average growth rate of 9 East Asian countries over the 1970-2000 period.
            
2 Human resources include schooling and life expectancy variables.46
Table 6. Growth Prospects for East Asia and Latin America, 2001-2010
Predicted per capita GDP growth, 2001-2010
East Asia 3.78
Latin America 2.34
Difference in predicted growth 1.44
Predicted per capita GDP in 2010
(ratio to per capita GDP in 2000)
East Asia 19092 (1.48)
Latin America 7073  (1.24)
Contributions to the difference in per capita  GDP







Institutions and Policy 1.26
Government Consumption 0.26




Terms of Trade 0.02
Notes: The projection assumes that all countries maintain the policies recorded in 2000. Per capita GDP levels and growth
rates are based on 1996 international prices, based on the Penn World Tables v.5.6. The projected growth rates for 2001-
2010 are obtained by multiplying 2000 values (or the 1995-99 period average) of explanatory variables by the estimated
coefficients in the panel regression of column (2) in table 3.  Terms-of-trade shocks are assumed to be equal to those in the
1990s. We have assumed no balance-of-payments crisis.47
Table 7.  International Tests in Mathematics and Science
Mathematics Science










Czech Republic 52.3 57.4
Denmark 46.5 43.9
France 64.2 49.2 68.6 45.1
Germany 48.4 49.9
Greece 44 44.9
Hong Kong 56.4 49.5
Hungary 68.4 50.2 73.4 51.8
Iceland 45.9 46.2
Iran, I.R. of 40.1 43.6










New Zealand 47.2 48.1
Norway 46.1 48.3
Portugal 48.3 42.3 62.6 42.8
Romania 45.4 48.6
Russian Federation 70.2 50.1 71.3 53.8
Singapore 60.1 54.5
Slovak Republic 50.8 54.4
South Africa 34.8 31.7
Spain 55.4 44.8 67.5 47.7
Sweden 47.7 48.8
Switzerland 70.8 50.6 73.7 48.4
Taiwan 72.7 75.6
Thailand 49.5 49.3
United Kingdom 60.6 47 68.3 49
United States 55.3 47.6 67 50.8
Yugoslavia 57.1 49.8 70.3 5348
Notes: The data are average test scores for the students of age 13 for mathematics and
science. The scores that are available in various format, are transformed to the percent-
correct form for comparability. The IAEP means the tests of mathematics and science
achievements of 13-years-old students conducted by the international Assessment of
Educational Progress in 1991. The Third International Mathematics and Science Study
(TIMSS) is conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational
Achievement (IEA) in 1994 and 1995. For the TIMSS, Belgium is French-speaking
region.
Source: US Department of Education, Digest of Education Statistics, 1992; and IEA,
Third International Mathematics and Science Study, 1994-1995, 2000.49
Table 8.  Effects of Gini Index on Growth and Other Variables
Dependent variable Gini index
(1) Growth rate regression -0.001
(0.018)
(2) Fertility (log) 1.335
(0.146)
(3) Government consumption/GDP 0.143
(0.036)
(4) Secondary school enrollment -0.800
(0.098)
(5) Rule-of-law index -0.869
(0.126)
Notes:  In the growth rate regression in row (1), Gini index is added to systems in column 2 of table 3. The
Gini value around 1970 appears in the equation for growth from 1970 to 1975, and so on. The five-year
lagged value is added to the list of instruments. The regressions for the other dependent variables come
from systems of the six five-year periods from 1970 to 1999 for each variable.  The log of per capita GDP
and Gini index are included as independent variables. Estimation is by three-stage least squares.
Instruments are the lagged values of the log of per capita GDP and Gini index.50
Table 9. Incidence of Balance-of-Payments Crises, Over the1970-1999 Period
1970-1999 260 221 14 55
1970-75 26 15 2 6
1975-79 29 21 1 7
1980-84 46 39 4 12
1985-89 47 46 1 14
1990-94 72 62 1 13
1995-99 40 38 5 3
Notes: A balance-of-payments crisis is defined by combining two criteria. A balance-of-payments crisis is
judged to occur in the year when a country experienced a nominal currency depreciation of at least 25
percent in any quarter of a specific year and the depreciation rate exceeded that in the previous quarter by a
margin of at least 10 percent. A crisis is also identified at the month of a year when an indicator of currency
pressure, a weighted average of monthly nominal exchange depreciation and monthly foreign reserve loss,
exceeds three standard deviations above the mean of the indicator over the sample period for each country,
provided that either the monthly nominal depreciation rate or percentage change of reserve loss exceeds 10
percent. A crisis that is not at least 3 years after the latest crisis is counted as a continuation of the initial
crisis rather than an independent crisis.






Table 10: Macroeconomic Indicators during Balance-of-payments Crises in East
Asia and Latin America
A. East Asia
av. t-3 t-4 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 av. t+3 t+4
Indonesia (1997)
  GDP growth (%) 7.4 8.2 8.0 4.5 -13.1 0.8 4.2
  Inflation (%) 9.1 9.4 8.0 6.7 57.6 20.3 8.3
  Budget balance (% GDP) -0.2 1.0 1.3 -0.9 -2.4 -1.6 -2.6
  Current account (% GDP) -1.5 -3.2 -3.4 -2.2 4.4 4.1 4.6
  Capital account (% GDP) 2.9 5.1 4.8 -0.3 -10.1 -4.2 -7.2
  Real exchange rate (index) 100.6 102.8 99.5 107.1 212.2 139.1 147.3
  Short-term debt/total debt (%) 59.1 60.1 59.6 66.0 161.9 105.9 93.8
  Short-term debt/reserves (%) 171.9 232.1 234.4 218.1 110.3 67.3 59.2
  External debt/GDP (%) 20.3 26.2 31.4 25.2 16.6 12.0 12.1
Korea (1997)
  GDP growth (%) 6.9 8.9 6.8 5.0 -6.7 10.9 6.2
  Inflation (%) 5.5 4.4 5.0 4.4 7.5 0.8 3.2
  Budget balance (% GDP) 0.9 -0.8 -1.0 -0.8 -2.7 -2.7 1.3
  Current account (% GDP) -0.3 -1.7 -4.4 -1.7 12.7 6.0 2.3
  Capital account (% GDP) 1.8 3.5 4.6 -1.9 -2.6 3.1 0.2
  Real exchange rate (index) 97.9 100.5 99.6 107.0 134.0 119.8 116.4
  Short-term debt/total debt (%) 22.0 25.2 31.7 33.7 47.6 32.9 28.1
  Short-term debt/reserves (%) 200.7 229.7 284.3 303.2 71.4 55.5 43.1
  External debt/GDP (%) 55.9 60.8 58.6 38.5 24.6 30.7 34.3
Malaysia (1997)
  GDP growth (%) 9.6 9.8 10.0 7.3 -7.4 6.1 4.4
  Inflation (%) 3.6 3.5 3.5 2.7 5.3 2.7 1.5
  Budget balance (% GDP) 0.6 0.8 0.7 2.4 -1.8 -3.2 -5.7
  Current account (% GDP) -6.1 -9.7 -4.8 -5.9 13.2 15.9 8.9
  Capital account (% GDP) 8.9 8.6 9.4 2.2 -3.5 -8.4 -5.9
  Real exchange rate (index) 99.7 96.8 93.4 96.5 117.1 118.2 115.1
  Short-term debt/total debt (%) 43.9 41.5 45.2 49.4 60.1 53.8 49.3
  Short-term debt/reserves (%) 37.0 40.8 54.3 79.1 44.6 28.7 23.9
  External debt/GDP (%) 31.4 26.3 32.2 33.2 26.3 20.6 16.4
Philippines (1997)
  GDP growth (%) 3.3 4.7 5.8 5.2 -0.6 3.4 3.8
  Inflation (%) 7.6 8.0 9.0 5.9 9.7 6.7 5.2
  Budget balance (% GDP) -2.3 -1.4 -0.1 -1.5 -3.0 -3.3 -4.4
  Current account (% GDP) -5.1 -2.7 -4.8 -5.3 2.4 10.0 4.3
  Capital account (% GDP) 7.0 7.2 13.6 7.9 0.7 -1.2 -0.2
  Real exchange rate (index) 96.7 94.8 85.8 91.3 114.8 107.7 107.1
  Short-term debt/total debt (%) 63.1 54.8 54.9 62.1 82.2 76.2 78.5
  Short-term debt/reserves (%) 35.2 80.3 85.0 133.1 95.7 58.0 53.7
  External debt/GDP (%) 14.4 15.1 21.7 22.7 19.1 14.9 14.252
av. t-3 t-4 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 av. t+3 t+4
Thailand (1997)
  GDP growth (%) 8.7 9.2 5.9 -1.4 -10.5 4.4 3.3
  Inflation (%) 4.2 5.8 5.8 5.6 8.1 0.3 1.6
  Budget balance (% GDP) 2.0 3.0 2.4 -0.9 -2.4 -3.5 -2.9
  Current account (% GDP) -5.3 -8.1 -8.1 -2.0 12.7 10.1 6.5
  Capital account (% GDP) 8.4 13.0 10.7 -8.0 -12.6 -9.0 -10.8
  Real exchange rate (index) 100.3 103.8 101.6 110.0 121.5 117.0 122.2
  Short-term debt/total debt (%) 48.7 59.8 62.0 72.5 93.9 77.7 61.9
  Short-term debt/reserves (%) 114.6 147.0 128.3 149.0 100.8 58.0 38.4
  External debt/GDP (%) 46.2 51.9 42.3 35.0 27.3 20.6 16.8
B. Latin America
av. t-3 t-4 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 av. t+3 t+4
Argentina (1991)
  GDP growth (%) 0.3 -7.0 -1.3 10.5 10.3 6.3 1.5
  Inflation (%) 237.2 3079.5 2314.0 171.7 24.9 10.6 3.8
  Budget balance (% GDP) -2.0 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.7 -0.6
  Current account (% GDP) -6.4 -7.1 -14.5 -9.5 -5.6 -11.0 -7.6
  Capital account (% GDP) 2.4 5.4 2.6 -1.0 -2.6 -3.0 -1.6
  Real exchange rate (index) 94.5 105.2 92.2 79.9 81.4 80.2 84.5
  Short-term debt/total debt (%) 26.0 28.1 30.8 26.7 19.8 12.6 10.8
  Short-term debt/reserves (%) 135.3 99.9 148.8 252.7 169.7 103.4 87.7
  External debt/GDP (%) 42.1 40.2 47.6 70.5 88.2 98.2 114.0
Brazil (1999)
  GDP growth (%) 3.5 3.3 0.1 0.8 4.4 1.4 2.2
  Inflation (%) 41.0 6.9 3.2 4.9 7.1 6.8 11.2
  Budget balance (% GDP) -6.7 -6.1 -8.0 -10.0 -4.6 -5.3 -10.3
  Current account (% GDP) -2.8 -3.8 -4.2 -4.8 -4.1 -4.6 -1.5
  Capital account (% GDP) 4.3 3.1 2.5 1.5 4.9 3.9 --
  Real exchange rate (index) 101.4 98.0 98.1 131.0 110.6 122.7 123.0
  Short-term debt/total debt (%) 69.6 74.5 85.9 87.9 87.3 86.9 89.0
  Short-term debt/reserves (%) 244.8 309.6 490.7 614.0 639.3 554.3 558.1
  External debt/GDP (%) 25.6 26.2 30.9 45.8 40.1 45.3 52.3
Chile (1982)
  GDP growth (%) 8.3 7.8 6.7 -13.4 -3.5 6.1 4.6
  Inflation (%) 36.8 35.1 19.7 9.9 27.3 19.9 25.1
  Budget balance (% GDP) 2.4 5.4 2.6 -1.0 -2.6 -3.0 -1.6
  Current account (% GDP) -6.4 -7.1 -14.5 -9.5 -5.6 -11.0 -7.6
  Capital account (% GDP) 11.6 11.8 14.6 3.4 -16.3 -0.4 -10.5
  Real exchange rate (index) 94.5 73.3 64.1 71.2 78.2 77.4 94.1
  Short-term debt/total debt (%) 26.0 28.1 30.8 26.7 19.8 12.6 10.8
  Short-term debt/reserves (%) 135.3 99.9 148.8 252.7 169.7 103.4 87.7
  External debt/GDP (%) 42.1 40.2 47.6 70.5 88.2 98.2 114.053
av. t-3 t-4 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 av. t+3 t+4
Colombia (1998)
  GDP growth (%) 5.5 2.1 3.4 0.6 -4.2 2.7 1.5
  Inflation (%) 21.8 20.8 18.3 18.6 10.2 9.3 7.1
  Budget balance (% GDP) -1.8 -3.7 -2.7 -3.6 -5.5 -3.5 -3.5
  Current account (% GDP) -4.7 -4.8 -5.4 -4.9 0.8 0.8 -1.8
  Capital account (% GDP) 4.6 6.9 6.2 3.4 -0.7 -0.1 2.9
  Real exchange rate (index) 96.5 90.3 86.5 89.7 92.2 88.1 94.2
  Short-term debt/total debt (%) 21.8 18.3 16.4 15.2 11.4 10.3 9.7
  Short-term debt/reserves (%) 71.3 60.7 58.4 64.0 52.7 42.2 37.1
  External debt/GDP (%) 31.2 33.8 33.1 37.5 43.5 44.1 48.5
Mexico (1994)
  GDP growth (%) 4.7 3.6 2.0 4.4 -6.2 5.2 5.9
  Inflation (%) 24.7 15.5 9.8 7.0 35.0 34.4 18.3
  Budget balance (% GDP) 0.2 4.5 0.5 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 -1.3
  Current account (% GDP) -4.1 -7.3 -5.8 -7.0 -0.5 -0.8 -2.9
  Capital account (% GDP) 6.0 8.1 8.4 3.7 -3.7 1.3 4.7
  Real exchange rate (index) 97.0 92.8 85.7 88.6 124.9 110.3 96.8
  Short-term debt/total debt (%) 33.6 39.0 39.9 47.5 33.8 20.3 21.5
  Short-term debt/reserves (%) 164.1 129.2 128.2 659.3 198.3 170.9 111.9
  External debt/GDP (%) 24.1 18.8 20.0 20.7 34.5 49.3 38.3
Argentina (2001)
  GDP growth (%) 6.0 -3.4 -0.8 -4.4 -11.0 3.0 4.5
  Inflation (%) 0.7 -1.2 -0.9 -1.1 25.9 22.3 13.0
  Budget balance (% GDP) -1.4 -2.9 -2.4 -3.3 -1.1 -- --
  Current account (% GDP) -4.5 -4.2 -3.1 -1.7 9.5 -- --
  Capital account (% GDP) 6.0 5.3 3.1 -5.1 -- -- --
  Real exchange rate (index) 98.6 91.9 93.8 89.5 164.5 -- --
  Short-term debt/total debt (%) 30.9 29.4 39.9 21.5 14.8 -- --
  Short-term debt/reserves (%) 172.2 163.1 236.2 247.7 217.7 -- --
  External debt/GDP (%) 44.4 51.4 52.3 62.4 150.8 -- --
Notes: The column t (t+or-j) corresponds to the year of (the year j before or after) the currency
crisis, which is indicated in parenthesis for each country.  The first column is the average of the
three and four years previous to the crisis.  The data on GDP, inflation, budget balance, current
account, capital account and reserves come from the IMF, World Economic Outlook database,
April 2003, and completed with JP Morgan (EMEI).  For the fiscal balance, in Latin America,
Indonesia and Thailand correspond to the central government, while the others correspond to
general government.  The real exchange rate corresponds to the JP-Morgan index, transformed to
measure the price of foreign goods respect to domestic goods, so an increase is a real
depreciation.  The index is equal to 100 for t-4.  Data on debt, and composition, come from BIS,
JP Morgan, and Central Bank of Chile.54
Table 12.  Determinants of Real Output Cost from the Balance-of-Payments Crises
(1) (2) (3)










Foreign reserve/short-term debt (t-1) -0.0025
(0.0014)











































No. of crisis episodes 81 73 81
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is a
measure of output cost from a crisis which is calculated by summing the
differences between the trend GDP growth rate and GDP growth rates over
the three years including the crisis year and the following two years.55
Appendix Table: Balance-of-Payment Crises in Latin America and East Asia, 1970-
1999
East Asia
China 1984M1 1989M12 1994M1
Indonesia 1978M11 1983M4 1997M9
Korea 1971M12 1980M1 1997M11
Malaysia 1997M8
Philippines 1970M2 1983M10 1997M9
Thailand 1997M7
Latin America
Argentina 1975M3 1981M4 1987M2 1991M1
Bolivia 1972M10 1980M1 1985M9
Brazil 1979M12 1983M2 1987M1 1991M1 1999M1
Chile 1971M7 1975M1 1982M8
Colombia 1998M9
Costa Rica 1974M4 1981M1
Dominican Republic 1985M1 1990M8
Ecuador 1970M8 1982M5 1986M8 1992M9 1998M10




Jamaica 1978M5 1983M11 1991M9




Peru 1976M6 1982M12 1987M10 1992M6
Trinidad and Tobago 1985M12 1993M4
Uruguay 1972M3 1982M11 1987M12
Venezuela 1984M2 1989M3 1994M556
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Source: World Bank, World Development Report.57
Figure 2








-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0  +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8
Years Before/After Crisis
No crisis All Crises East Asia 9 L. America 2158
Figure 3




Adjustments of GDP Growth rates during the 1997 East Asian Crisis
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Adjustment of GDP Growth Rates during Latin American Crises in the 198061
Figure 6
Adjustment of GDP Growth Rates In Latin American Countries in the 
1990s
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